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Traynor (Drennan) v Hand (Baird):   
Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing 
 
Victor P. Goldberg 
 
 The contrasting opinions of Learned Hand (Baird v. Gimbel)1 and Roger Traynor 
(Drennan v. Star Paving)2 are a longstanding feature in Contracts casebooks.  Over 40 
years ago, Professor Harry Jones noted: “[T]his is the judicial big league.  Learned Hand 
on one side, for his court, Chief Justice Traynor for his court on the other.  You can’t do 
much better than that.  I would suggest, without lack of respect, that is somewhat like 
comparing a Joe Dimaggio of the generation immediately past with a Willie Mays of the 
present generation.”3  We could perhaps update the baseball references, but the core 
sentiment of Professor Jones’ remark remains intact.  The central issue in the two cases 
was the revocability of an offer.  Hand held that an offeror was free to revoke prior to 
acceptance, while Traynor held that the offer was irrevocable so long as the offeree had 
relied on it.  Traynor’s decision was well received, since contracts scholarship at that time 
was pushing to expand the domain of promissory estoppel.4  The fact that Traynor’s 
opinion is prominently featured in most Contracts casebooks suggests that some really 
important contract principle had been promulgated.5  Indeed, it was the basis for a whole 
new section of the Restatements, Section 87(2). 
                                                 
1 64 F.2d 344. 
2 333 P.2d 757. 
3 Charles D. Kelso, Teaching Teachers: A Reminiscence of the 1971 AALS Law Teachers Clinic and a 
Tribute to Harry Jones. 24 J. of Legal Education 606, 623 (1971). 
 
4 Cite.  Gilmore? 
5 I looked at the 17 contracts casebooks on my shelf; only two failed to cite either case. Drennan 
was a main case in 11 and Baird in six.   
Six casebooks used both Baird and Drennan, respectively, as a main case: CONTRACT AND 
RELATED OBLIGATION 462–64, 464–68 (Robert S. Summers & Robert A. Hilman eds., 4th ed. 2001); 
CONTRACTS 742–45, 745–49 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 4th ed. 2008); CONTRACTS 395–98, 399–403 (John P. 
Dawson et al eds., 8th ed. 2003); CONTRACTS 253–4, 249–53 (James F. Hogg et al eds., 2008) PROBLEMS 
IN CONTRACT LAW 190–92, 193–97 (Charles L. Knapp et al eds., 5th ed. 2003; STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 
388–90; 392–95 (Ian Ayres & Richard E. Speidel eds., 7th ed. 2008).  
Five casebooks used only Drennan as a main case. Of those five books, three omitted discussion 
of Baird altogether: BASIC CONTRACT LAW 448–52 (Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg eds., 8th ed. 
2006); CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE 304–7 (Gerald E. Berendt et al eds., 2d ed. 2009); PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT LAW 189–92 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2001). Two casebooks cited Drennan as a main case and 
discussed Baird in notes: CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 598–603 (Arthur Rosett & Daniel J. 
Bussel eds., 6th ed. 1999) (briefly excerpting Baird in notes at 524); CONTRACTS 222–27 (E. Allan 
Farnsworth et al eds., 7th ed. 2008) (discussing Baird in notes at 222).  
Four casebooks cited both cases in notes and/or through other cases: CONTRACTS 363–66 
(Christina L. Kunz & Carol L. Chomsky eds., 2010) (discussing both cases through Pavel Enterprises, Inc. 
v. A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521 (Md. 1996)); CONTRACTS 595–6, 605, 606, 798 (Stewart Macaulay et al 
eds., 2d ed. 2003); CONTRACTS 1276–80 (Ian R. MacNeil & Paul J. Gudel eds., 3d ed. 2001) (discussing 
Drennan in notes and both cases via Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 190 
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1971)); CONTRACT LAW & THEORY 237–43 (Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus eds., 4th 
ed. 2007) (discussing both cases through Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521 (Md. 
1996) and in notes).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1795322
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 The specific context of the two opinions was a dispute between a general 
contractor and a subcontractor.  When a subcontractor informed a contractor that it had 
submitted a mistaken bid before the contractor had accepted it, Hand held that the bid 
was an offer and the sub was free to revoke its offer.  A quarter century later Traynor, 
faced with the same problem, made an estoppel argument: so long as the contractor was 
relying upon the sub’s bid, the offer was irrevocable.  Implicit in the decision’s favorable 
reception is the notion that the Drennan rule generalizes beyond its narrow context. 
 
 In fact, it doesn’t.  Examination of every decision citing Drennan or Baird, yields 
a number of significant facts. First, while Drennan has prevailed in most jurisdictions, 
application of the reliance qualification has been, at best, problematic.  Second, Drennan 
doesn’t travel well.  Aside from the general contractor versus subcontractor context, very 
few opinions rely on Drennan.  Third, its spawn, Section 87(2), has been a dud.  Like 
Drennan, it is rarely cited outside the GC-sub context; but, unlike Drennan, it is rarely 
cited even in that context.  Fourth, and most importantly, Drennan’s context has been 
ignored.  Nearly all Drennan-type GC-sub cases involve a public construction project.  
The fact that the issue rarely seems to get litigated when the project is being done for 
private owners is the big result.  Private owners have figured out how to cope with the 
problem, whereas public owners, saddled with regulation of the bidding process, have 
been less successful. 
 
Drennan and Baird, it should be emphasized, are not free-standing contract 
disputes, a fact that judges and contracts scholars seem to ignore.  They are embedded in 
regulation of public construction, both of the owner-GC and GC-sub relationships.  The 
case law, by and large, ignores the regulatory context, implicitly treating all the cases as 
if the winner of a competitive sealed bid gives the owner an irrevocable option to use it at 
the bid price. Moreover, the law either ignores regulation of the GC-sub relationship or 
treats the regulations as unrelated to the contract issues.  Thus, we have the peculiar 
phenomenon of a supposedly general contract doctrine that applies only in a specific 
context, but which ignores the features of that context.  
 
 That the problem is largely confined to public competitive bidding suggests two 
important conclusions.  First, while contract principles might make it difficult for 
contractors on public projects to vary the irrevocability of subcontractor bids (offers), 
there is no reason to rely on the common law.  Governments could determine whether 
some or all subcontractor bids should be irrevocable as part of the overall regulatory 
scheme.  Of course, given that the regulations are the product of a political process, 
whether governments will do that intelligently is an open question.  Second, analyses 
purporting to analyze the efficiency of the two rules are largely beside the point.6  
                                                                                                                                                 
 Only two casebooks failed to cite either case: CONTRACTS (George W. Kuney & Robert M. Lloyd 
eds., 2006); THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS (Bruce W. Frier & James J. White eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 
6 See, e.g., Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in 
Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249 (1996); Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Rationalizing 
Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range, 3 Rev. L. & Econ. 231 (2007); and 
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Without an understanding of the nature of the public regulations, we cannot say anything 
about the efficiency of either rule. If we want to know the “efficient” rules, then we 
should look at how private owners resolve the problem.  And on this the case law is 
unhelpful. 
 
 The Drennan rule is asymmetric.  That is, while the sub’s bid is irrevocable, the 
GC is not bound.  At least that is what one might think if one looked only at contract 
decisions.  But the picture on the ground is more complicated.  The GC’s freedom is 
constrained both by legal regulations and extra-contractual mechanisms, specifically bid 
depositories.  For decades subs have complained bitterly about the GC’s ability to 
renegotiate the price after the winning bid had been announced.  Their complaints about 
the “evils” of bid shopping, chopping, and chiseling are a recurring theme in legislation, 
commentary, and opinions.  My impression is that contracts professors have by and large 
bought into the notion that such behavior is inappropriate, not the sort of thing that 
respectable businessmen would do. However, once we recognize that these are the public 
bidding counterpart to the haggling that takes place in the private contracting, these lose 
at least some of their negative connotations.  The fact that the behavior appears to be 
common in both the public and private construction projects has implications for the 
analysis that will be developed below. 
 
 The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section I summarizes Baird and 
Drennan.7  Section II provides a brief description of the public competitive bidding 
process for construction projects.  It pays particular attention to the so-called evils of bid 
shopping.  Section III analyzes the GC versus sub cases.  Section IV concerns the reverse 
cases in which the sub is plaintiff.  It emphasizes the role of government regulation and 
collective action in cabining the common law solution. In Section V, we turn to the 
limited role of Drennan and Section 87(2) outside the GC-sub context.  Section VI 
provides a conclusion. 
 
I. The Core Cases 
 
A. Baird v. Gimbel  
 
The Pennsylvania Department of Highways put the contract for a new building out to 
bid using a sealed bid process.  Gimbel, the large New York department store, submitted 
bids to over twenty general contractors, including Baird, to supply the linoleum.   Baird 
submitted the low bid and was given the contract.  The Gimbel estimator had erred by 
understating the amount of linoleum necessary for the task.  When it realized its error, it 
promptly telegraphed all the GC’s, including Baird.  However, it was too late—Baird had 
                                                                                                                                                 
Richard Craswell, offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance. 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 498-499, 532-533 
(1995-96). 
 
7 For a detailed discussion of the two cases, including an examination of the briefs and records, see Alfred S. 
Konefsky, Freedom And Interdependence In Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor And Hand And Promissory 
Estoppel U. Cin. L. Rev. 1169. 
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already submitted its bid.  Gimbel refused to perform and Baird, insisting that it had a 
valid contract, sued for breach. 
 
Hand held that Gimbel had made an offer, but had withdrawn it before Baird had 
accepted.  Hand rejected the new-fangled notion of promissory estoppel. He likewise 
rejected the notion that Baird had received an option “if its bid was accepted, but not 
binding it to take and pay, if it could get a better bargain elsewhere.  There is no reason to 
believe that the defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation.”8 
 
If the parties wanted to make the offer irrevocable, Hand noted, they could have done 
so explicitly: “The contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting upon a 
contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does not in the 
end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect 
themselves.”9  There was no need to imply that the offer was irrevocable since it could 
have been done explicitly.  He left unstated how they could practically have contracted 
over this, a point to which we shall return in Section IV.  Hand’s bottom line was simply 
that an offer is revocable until the offeree accepts.  The offeree’s reliance would not 
create an enforceable obligation. 
 
B. Drennan v. Star Paving 
 
The essential facts of Drennan have been drilled into law students for decades; I 
will only briefly summarize them here.  I will, however, add one fact which Traynor left 
out of the opinion. 
 
 The GC, Drennan, was bidding on the Monte Vista School Job in the Lancaster 
school district.  The subcontractor, Star Paving, submitted its bid by telephone the day the 
GC’s bid was due.  The GC submitted its bid to the authority, naming Star as the 
contractor (as required by statute).  Drennan’s bid was the low bid and it was, therefore, 
chosen for the project.  Before Drennan could say to the sub “I accept,” the sub 
announced that it had made a mistake and couldn’t (and wouldn’t) do the job for the 
quoted price.  Drennan found a substitute for about 50% more, completed the job, and 
sued for the difference.  Following the courts below, Traynor found that the GC’s 
reliance made the sub’s bid irrevocable.10  “Given . . .  [that the GC] is bound by his own 
                                                 
8 Baird v. Gimbel, 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d. Cir. 1933). 
9 Baird v. Gimbel, 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d. Cir. 1933). 
 
10 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).  His reasoning was an amalgam of 
Restatements 45 and 90: 
Thus section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts provides: ‘If an offer for a unilateral 
contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered 
by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of 
immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or 
tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a 
reasonable time.’ In explanation, comment b states that the ‘main offer includes as a 
subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested performance is 
given, the offeror will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted. 
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bid, it is only fair that [the GC] should have at least an opportunity to accept [the sub’s] 
bid after the general contract has been awarded to him.”11 However, he added a 
qualification not in the lower courts’ opinions: “It bears noting that a general contractor is 
not free to delay acceptance after he has been awarded the general contract in the hope of 
getting a better price. Nor can he reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the 
same time claim a continuing right to accept the original offer.”12  Such behavior would 
indicate a lack of reliance and would let the sub off the hook.  The subsequent case law, 
as we shall see in Section III, shows that implementing this qualification is not so easy.  
Traynor concludes by asserting that it is appropriate to assign the risk of the sub’s 
mistake to the sub:  “As between the subcontractor who made the bid and the general 
contractor who reasonably relied on it, the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on 
the party who caused it.”13 
 
 While Traynor alluded to the statutory restraints on the GC (it was bound by its 
bid) he does not recognize any other statutory restrictions on the public bidding process.  
There were significant statutory constraints on the GC-sub relationship defined by 
California’s “naming” statute:  
 
No general contractor whose bid is accepted shall, without the consent of 
the awarding authority, either: 
(a) Substitute any person as subcontractor in place of the subcontractor 
designated in the original bid. 
(b) Permit any such subcontract to be assigned or transferred or allow it to 
be performed by anyone other than the original subcontractor listed in the 
bid. 
(c) Sublet or subcontract any portion of the work in excess of one-half 
(1/2) of one per cent (1%) of the general contractor's total bid as to which 
his original bid did not designate a subcontractor. 
(d) The awarding authority may consent to the substitution of another 
person as a subcontractor, when the subcontractor named in the bid after 
having had a reasonable opportunity to do so, fails or refuses to execute a 
written contract, when said written contract, based upon the general terms, 
conditions, plans and specifications for the project involved, or the terms 
of such subcontractor's written bid, is presented to him by the contractor.14 
 
 What’s going on?  This statute is designed to give substantial protection to subs.  
If the GC named a particular sub, the GC is stuck with that sub, unless the awarding 
authority grants permission to change.  If another sub came along with a better deal, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Part performance or tender may thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary promise. 
Moreover, merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as 
sufficient reason for making a promise binding (see s 90). (At 759-760) 
11 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).  
12 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).  
13 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 761 (Cal. 1958).  
 
14 Reproduced in Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. 71 Cal.2d 719, 456 P.2d 975, 79 
Cal.Rptr. 319 (1969). (emphasis added) 
 7
GC and the authority could figure out a way to take advantage of the deal, so the sub’s 
protection would only be partial.  The statute appears to be silent on the specific issue: 
the GC’s freedom to walk away is somewhat limited, but the statute says nothing about 
the sub’s freedom.  Traynor’s opinion provides some limits on that freedom without 
noting that it is part of an overall regulatory scheme.  In the next case, we will see why 
that matters. 
 
C. Son of Drennan 
 
About a decade later, Traynor had another GC-sub dispute on his plate.15  Here he 
dealt with the reverse problem, a sub complaining that although he was low bidder, the 
GC (Holder) replaced him with another.  Holder, the winning low bidder for the general 
contract told the school district that it had inadvertently listed this sub rather than its 
preferred sub and it asked permission to change; the school district consented, and the 
disappointed sub sued for damages.  The sub claimed that it had relied on the 
presumption that it had been selected, the reliance consisting of refraining to bid on other 
jobs in order to remain within its bonding limits.  The trial court granted the GC’s motion 
to dismiss.  Traynor, in agreeing with the lower court on contract grounds, came up with 
the usual asymmetric result—the GC is not bound.16  The GC did not make a promise; 
ergo, there could be no promissory estoppel. 
 
But he’s not done. In the years between Drennan and this case, California had 
amended the afore-mentioned naming statute.  Now the GC needed not only the 
authority’s consent, but also the sub’s as well.   
 
The amendments made by the 1963 Subletting and Subcontracting Fair 
Practices Act stated the purposes of the statute in a preamble and completely 
revised the section dealing with substitution of subcontractors . . . . The 
purpose of the amended statute is not limited . . .  to providing the awarding 
authority with an opportunity to approve substitute subcontractors. Its 
purpose is also to protect the public and subcontractors from the evils 
attendant upon the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling subsequent to 
the award of the prime contract for a public facility. Thus [the revised 
statute] clearly limits the right of the prime contractor to make substitutions 
and the discretion of the awarding authority to consent to substitutions …  
Unless a listed subcontractor ‘becomes insolvent or fails or refuses to 
perform a written contract for the work or fails or refuses to meet the bond 
requirements of the prime contractor,’ the prime contractor may not 
substitute another subcontractor for the listed subcontractor and the 
awarding authority may not consent to such a substitution until the contract 
                                                 
15 Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. 71 Cal.2d 719, 456 P.2d 975, 79 Cal.Rptr. 319 
(1969). 
16 See the discussion in Section IV.  
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is presented to the listed subcontractor and he, after having had a reasonable 
opportunity to do so, fails or refuses to execute the written contract.17  
 
Leaving aside the rationale for the revision, the effect is clear.  The original legislation 
gave subs limited protection—the GC needed only the authority’s approval to replace the 
named sub.  The 1963 amendments meant that the named sub could not be replaced 
without its acquiescence (with some qualifications).   That was enough for Traynor to 
overrule Holder’s demurrer.  “Accordingly, under the facts as pleaded in this case, Holder 
had no right to substitute another subcontractor in place of plaintiff.”18  The sub loses on 
its breach of contract claim, but its breach of a statutory duty claim survives. 
 
 It is not clear to me why Traynor puts things into two discrete boxes.  When 
people are contracting in the shadow of the statute, there is no reason to disassociate the 
contract from its context.  He could easily have reframed the statute in contract language: 
the GC in any situation covered by the statute would be making an irrevocable offer to all 
listed subs.  By submitting a bid, the sub gives a conditional acceptance of the offer. If 
the sub’s bid is listed (whether it is lowest or not) and if the GC is awarded the contract, 
then the GC is bound to use the sub. There are additional qualifications, as Traynor noted. 
But the net effect is to turn Drennan on its head—the GC is bound, but the sub is not.  
 
 My concern is not with the precise reasoning of this decision.  I want to draw 
three morals from this case.  First, the GC-sub relationship for public works is typically 
regulated by statute.  Second, the statutes typically are sub-friendly.  Third, the notion 
that contract principles can dictate outcomes independent of the statutory regulations is 
incorrect.  
 
This decision provides a hint of the irony in Drennan and its ilk; the point will be 
developed more below.  The statutes tend to favor the subs; moreover, the judicial 
rhetoric complements the statutes, invoking the evils of bid shopping and concerns about 
injustice.  The natural trajectory of this mix of statutes and rhetoric would, I should have 
thought, have yielded a string of contract decisions favoring the subs.  Yet the reality is 
the opposite of that. The post-Drennan cases generally favor the GC. One might surmise 
that what we observe is the result of courts compensating for the statutory imbalance 
favoring the subs. However, nothing in the language in the decisions even hints at that.  
The decisions either ignore the statutes or, like Traynor in this case, treat them as if they 
were from another planet. 
 
II. Construction Bidding 
 
 In the typical Drennan-type case the general contractor submits a sealed bid to the 
owner who must choose the lowest responsible bidder.19  After the owner determines the 
                                                 
17 Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 980-81 (1969). See CAL. GOV. 
CODE § 4107 (West 1943) (repealed 1986).  
18 Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 981 (1969). 
 
19 Responsible has two meanings.  First, is it responsive—did it comply with the conditions imposed by the 
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lowest responsible bid, that bidder is bound, but the owner is not; it maintains the right to 
abandon the project.  With some exceptions, the GC is strictly bound to its bid price;20 the 
claim that the GC cannot renegotiate its price with the owner often shows up in the 
decisions.21 
 
 I will provide a little more flesh to the bidding process below.  But first, we 
should recognize the identity of the “owner.”  Typically, it is a governmental entity.  
Most government construction projects require competitive sealed bids.22  The 
procedures are typically spelled out in statutes and these statutes vary over jurisdictions, 
subject matter, and time.  Private owners are much less likely to use a sealed bid 
competition.  The private owner is concerned with price, quality of performance, and 
duration; it will choose the procurement mechanism that is expected to best balance these 
factors.  Seldom will that be a sealed bid process. 
 
The public owner has to consider these factors as well, but has one additional 
concern—corruption. 
   
The purpose of requiring governmental entities to open the contracts 
process to public bidding is to eliminate favoritism, fraud and corruption; 
avoid misuse of public funds; and stimulate advantageous market place 
competition. . . .   Because of the potential for abuse arising from 
deviations from strict adherence to standards which promote these public 
benefits, the letting of public contracts universally receives close judicial 
scrutiny and contracts awarded without strict compliance with bidding 
requirements will be set aside. This preventative approach is applied even 
where it is certain there was in fact no corruption or adverse effect upon 
the bidding process, and the deviations would save the entity money. The 
importance of maintaining integrity in government and the ease with 
which policy goals underlying the requirement for open competitive 
bidding may be surreptitiously undercut, mandate strict compliance with 
bidding requirements.23 
                                                                                                                                                 
owner (including statutes)?  Second, is the bidder up to the task, technically and financially?  Not all 
competitive bidding processes award the project to the lowest bidder.  In a dispute over a cable television 
system, the court said:  “In American Totalisator, the bid documents required that the ‘lowest responsible 
bidder’ be awarded the contract; thus, the Court would not permit an applicant to lower its bid after 
examining a competitor's bid. In the instant case, however, the RFP does not provide that the lowest 
responsible bidder will be selected. Rather, because of the advanced state-of-the-art of cable television, the 
Ordinance and the RFP stress an examination to reveal ‘the most qualified applicants.’ Although the 
amount of the bid is to be considered in reviewing these proposals, it is by no means the only criterion in 
this particular selection process.” McCloskey v. Independence Cablevision Corp.  74 Pa.Cmwlth. 435,442, 
460 A.2d 1205, 1208.  The cited case is American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 489 Pa. 568, 577, 414 A.2d 
1037, 1041 (1980). 
20 David B. Harrison, J.D. “Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid 
was based upon his own mistake or that of his employee” 2 A.L.R.4th 991 (Originally published in 1980). 
21 Cite cases. 
22 “Nearly all construction procurement with public money requires competitive bidding.”  Richter and 
Mitchell (p 69) 
23 MCM Const., Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco 66 Cal.App.4th 359, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 44, 98 Cal. 
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The sealed bid process has the apparent virtue of reducing sweetheart deals 
between elected officials or bureaucrats and the construction firms.  So, to police 
corruption governments must rely on a procurement system that is less efficient than that 
which is available to the private sector.24  To anticipate Section III B, that is why the case 
law is so heavily tilted toward government projects. 
 
 The generic process of putting together the GC’s bid has been described in a 
number of cases.25  The owner puts the project out to bid and establishes a firm deadline 
(e.g., October 9 at 2 p.m.) for bid submission. The GC’s request bids for pieces of the 
project from subs, and each sub submits a bid (usually the same bid) to some (or all) the 
GC’s.  The subs submit their bids as close to the deadline as possible both to prevent the 
GC from shopping their bids and to incorporate the most up-to-date information.  The GC 
uses those bids as inputs in determining how much it would bid.  If its bid happens to be 
the lowest responsible bid, compliant with the owner’s conditions, the GC will have a 
fixed price contract with the owner and a batch of offers from the subs. In effect, the GC 
gives the owner an irrevocable option.  The GC is committed, but the owner need not go 
forward.  If it does choose to go forward, it will be bound to use this general contractor. 
The sub might attempt to back out before the GC accepts its offer, as in Drennan and 
Baird.   Or the GC might negotiate with the sub or its competitors to get a better deal. 
 
 There are a number of variations on this generic story.  In the minority of cases 
that mention the price for the entire project, the sub’s bid typically accounted for less than 
two percent of the total.  However, there were a handful of extreme outliers.  In Pavel 
Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., Inc.,26 for instance, the sub’s bid was for more than 
half the project.27  The sub’s bid might be oral or written.28  The GC might simply request 
                                                                                                                                                 
Daily Op. Serv. 6828, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9329.  “Louisiana's Public Bid Law was enacted to secure 
free and unrestricted competition among bidders, to protect taxpayers from contracts entered into by public 
officials who are motivated by favoritism and fraud, and to avoid contracts for exorbitant and extortionate 
prices.” Percy J. Matherne Contractor, Inc. v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co. 915 F.Supp. 818, 107 
Ed. Law Rep. 665.   
24 A different form of corruption sometimes appears—bid rigging.  From United States v. Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) through the highway bid rigging cases, collusive bidding has been a 
recurring tale. 
25 “Despite the rise of alternative project delivery systems and related changes to procurement 
methodologies, competitive, sealed bidding remains a mainstay in the award of construction contracts, 
particularly on public projects. Competitive bidding creates extraordinary time and price pressures on the 
bidders' side of the process. General contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers at each level are straining to 
get the right price in at just the right time, while still meeting the owner's bidding deadline. It is a pressure 
cooker environment fraught with opportunities for mistake and miscommunication.” Neal J. Sweeney and 
Geoffrey Dendy, Holding Subcontractors To Their Bids/Edition II, Construction Briefings, September 
1999.   
26 674 A.2d 521. 
27 In C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Associates, Inc. 414 P.2d 873, the sub’s bid accounted for about one-
third of the GC’s bid. 
28 Oral offers from the subs raise the statute of frauds issue and how it interacts with promissory estoppel.  
Some courts hold that the statute of frauds does not preclude finding an irrevocable offer; see B & W Glass, 
Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. 829 P.2d 809; Janke Const. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F.Supp. 
687, aff'd. 527 F.2d 772 (7 Cir. 1976); Loranger Const. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306 
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bids or it might interact with the potential subs prior to the closing date. The scope of 
subs’ bids might not be directly comparable.29   The number of subs might be large, but 
there are some instances in which there is only one sub bidding.  The sub might submit 
bids to only some of the GCs and it might not submit the same bids to each.  The time 
between the bids being revealed and the owner entering into a contract with the GC could 
drag on for months.  These factors, as well as others, will have a differential impact on 
the attractiveness of irrevocability.  However, there is no indication in the case law that 
the courts pay any attention to the differences. 
 
 If the sub’s bid were treated as an irrevocable offer, the GC would have a valuable 
option.  The value increases with the length of time and the variance of the sub’s costs, in 
particular, its opportunity costs. If the expected value of the option to the GC were 
greater than the expected cost to the sub of providing it, the parties would have an 
incentive to agree to make the option irrevocable.  Both the value to the GC and the cost 
to the sub depend on the context.  There is no reason to believe that a one size fits all rule 
would work.  The plasticity of both “reliance” and “injustice” allows the Drennan rule to 
tailor the rule to the situation.  However, since neither concept is linked to the costs and 
benefits of the option, any success would be fortuitous.  
 
A. Bid Shopping and Related “Evils” 
 
In its dealings with the subs, the GC could attempt to bargain down the price.  For 
generations, subcontractors have complained about the GC’s post-bid attempts to 
renegotiate the price.   The GC’s flexibility is characterized in unflattering terms as bid 
shopping, bid chopping, bid peddling, and chiseling.  It is evil or immoral, so they say.  
California, as noted above (at fn xxx) has legislation restricting the GC’s option, as do 
many other jurisdictions.  The preamble to the California statute is instructive: 
 
The Legislature finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling 
in connection with the construction, alteration, and repair of public 
improvements often result in poor quality of material and workmanship to 
the detriment of the public, deprive the public of the full benefits of fair 
competition among prime contractors and subcontractors, and lead to 
insolvencies, loss of wages to employees, and other evils.30 
 
 One commentator has presented a lengthier litany of the evils associated with the 
GC’s post-bid flexibility:   
 
 Bid shopping and peddling have long been recognized as unethical 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Mass. Court of Appeals, 1978).  Others do, especially if the defendant is a supplier of goods; see Tiffany 
Inc. v. W. M. K. Transit Mix, Inc.,  493 P.2d 1220; Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co., Inc. v. Petrochem 
Maintenance, Inc. 463 F.Supp. 543, 26 UCC Rep.Serv. 621 D.C.Miss., 1978; C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-
Warner Corp. 552 F.2d 852; C. G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp. 586 S.W.2d 40.  
29 Almost a quarter of the cases involved some dispute over the scope of the obligation.  In some instances 
a sub would bid a price for one piece of the job contingent upon its being named to perform another piece.  
For example, ___ 
30 CAL. GOV. CODE § 4101 (West 1943) (repealed 1986).  
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by construction trade organizations. These ‘unethical,’ but common 
practices have several detrimental results. First, as bid shopping becomes 
common within a particular trade, the subcontractors will pad their initial 
bids in order to make further reductions during post-award negotiations. 
This artificial inflation of subcontractor's offers makes the bid process less 
effective. Second, subcontractors who are forced into post-award 
negotiations with the general often must reduce their sub-bids in order to 
avoid losing the award. Thus, they will be faced with a Hobson's choice 
between doing the job at a loss or doing a less than adequate job. Third, 
bid shopping and peddling tend to increase the risk of loss of the time and 
money used in preparing a bid. This occurs because generals and 
subcontractors who engage in these practices use, without expense, the bid 
estimates prepared by others. Fourth, it is often impossible for a general to 
obtain bids far enough in advance to have sufficient time to properly 
prepare his own bid because of the practice, common among many 
subcontractors, of holding sub-bids until the last possible moment in order 
to avoid pre-award bid shopping by the general. Fifth, many 
subcontractors refuse to submit bids for jobs on which they expect bid 
shopping. As a result, competition is reduced, and, consequently, 
construction prices are increased. Sixth, any price reductions gained 
through the use of post-award bid shopping by the general will be of no 
benefit to the awarding authority, to whom these price reductions would 
normally accrue as a result of open competition before the award of the 
prime contract. Free competition in an open market is therefore perverted 
because of the use of post-award bid shopping.31 
 
Most of the “evil” rhetoric, both on the pre-bid and post-bid level, is overblown, if 
not just wrong.  Note first that the sixth point assumes that GC’s would not anticipate in 
their bids the gains from shopping.  It focuses on the ex post, ignoring the ex ante.  If, 
however, a GC expects that he can knock ten percent off the lowest sub bid, his bid for 
the project will reflect that, in which case the gains would accrue to the awarding 
authority. If it doesn’t reflect that saving, the GC is unlikely to win that bid. 
 
Consider the pre-bid context.  A sub’s concern about bid shopping is its fear that 
the GC would take its bid and use it as the basis for inducing some other sub to quote a 
lower price.  In effect, the second sub would rely on the first’s bid, thus avoiding the 
                                                 
31 Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontract Construction Industry, 18 UCLA L.REV. 389, 
394-96.  (cited in Pavel). In 1995 the American Subcontractors Association, and the American Specialty 
Contractors issued a joint statement: ”Bid shopping or bid peddling are abhorrent business practices that 
threaten the integrity of the competitive bidding system that serves the construction industry and the 
economy so well.  The bid amount of one competitor should not be divulged to another before the award of 
the subcontract or order, nor should it be used by the contractor to secure a lower proposal from another 
bidder on that project (bid shopping). Neither should the subcontractor or supplier request information from 
the contractor regarding any subbid in order to submit a lower proposal on that project (bid peddling).”  
Nancy J. White, Theodore R. Bolema, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW IMPLICATIONS OF BID 
SHOPPING, Construction Lawyer, Winter, 2004, p.37. 
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costs of bid preparation.  This would be a classic free rider problem.  However, there is 
no evidence that courts really care or that these costs are substantial enough to matter.  Of 
the more than 60 Drennan-style cases, only one even mentions bidding costs, and there is 
no indication that the costs had any impact on the court’s analysis or disposition of the 
case.32  In one case in which a sub sued the GC, the sub argued that it would have been 
willing to incur bidding costs only if the GC would promise that it would use the sub, 
conditional on the GC getting the job.33  Otherwise, the case law pretty much ignores the 
magnitude of the sub’s pre-bid costs. 
 
If bid preparation costs are expected to be high, the possibility of free-riding 
might present a problem.34  Each sub would have an incentive to wait for others to incur 
the costs.  If they all wait, the quality of the cost estimates is compromised.  One case 
mentioned a bidding strategy that could arguably construed as an attempt to thwart free-
riding.  “The trial produced evidence that the practice of initially submitting high bids 
and then submitting lower bids in the final minutes before deadline is common among 
subcontractors in a competitive bidding situation and is done to confuse the competition 
in the event the subcontractor's bid amounts become known to other bidding 
subcontractors.”35 However, even where the bid preparation costs might be high and 
bidders do not obfuscate, free-riding is not likely to be a much of a problem. The free-
riding second sub would be subject to the “winner’s curse.”36  That is, since the first sub 
would have better information, the second sub would win the contract only when the first 
sub believed it could not profit by further cutting its price.  Over time, free-riding would 
be a losing proposition. 
 
 Bid chopping and shopping sounds bad (and chiseling sounds even worse).  But 
consider a typical private sector construction project.  The owner could play the GC’s off 
                                                 
32 “A team of Grafe-Weeks estimators and engineers, under the direction and supervision of Robert 
Bergstrom, worked for several weeks prior to the bidding day to arrive at a proposed bid on the 
subcontract.”  C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Associates, Inc. 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 873.  The 
subcontract bid was for about $3.4 million (1961 dollars), so it is unlikely that the bidding costs were 
significant.  In a case in which a sub sued for being denied a contract, the court found that the bid 
preparation costs were one to two per cent of the bid. Associated Plumbing Contractors of Marin, Sonoma 
and Mendocino Counties, Inc. v. F. W. Spencer & Son, Inc. 213 Cal.App.2d 1, 28 Cal.Rptr. 425.  In a sub-
sues GC-case preceding Drennan, the sub claimed pre-bid expenses of $210 on a $22,000 bid.  Milone & 
Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc. 301 P.2d 759 (1956). 
33 “ECM alleged in its complaint that it initially refused Maeda's solicitation to bid and only subsequently 
bid because Maeda promised that if ECM undertook the time and expense to prepare and submit an 
electrical subcontractor's bid, Maeda would award ECM the subcontract if its bid were the lowest.” 
Electrical Const. & Maintenance Co., Inc. v. Maeda Pacific Corp. 764 F.2d 619. 
34 We cannot generalize about the significance of bid preparation costs, but it turns out that they are often 
very low.  Take as an example the costs of a general contractor as a portion of the bid price.  The contract 
was for construction of tunnels and a station for the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA); the low bid was $68,912,089 and the costs of one of the bidders for preparing and submitting a bid 
were $44,869, or 0.06%. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Authority 1 
P.3d 63).   
35 Montgomery Industries Intern, Inc. v. Thomas Const. Co., Inc. 620 F.2d 91. 
36 If the second sub’s cost structure differs from the first’s, the informative value of the initial bid is less.  If 
the second sub could submit a bid $1 less than the first sub, and the first sub could not revise its bid, then 
the free riding strategy could work. 
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against each other and the GC’s, in turn, could play the subs off against each other.  A 
sub would have to decide whether incurring the estimation costs would be worth bearing 
and, if so, how aggressively it should compete.  If the chosen GC did not have a 
conditional contract with a sub, it would be free to negotiate with all the subs—that is, to 
shop. It’s called haggling.  Post-bid shopping by the GC following its success in a sealed 
bid auction would be no different from the haggling that take place in private 
construction projects.  The arguments against post-bid shopping should apply equally to 
the freely negotiated construction contracts as well.  Or, to turn that around, if we think 
that the negotiated contract market is working tolerably well, then perhaps the evils of 
shopping are overstated.  There is no reason to believe that quality in non-sealed bid 
construction would be impaired (the “Hobson’s choice”) by shopping.   
 
 I am not arguing that “the market” works perfectly.  For half a century the 
irrevocability a la Drennan model has been available to private parties.  If it were truly 
superior, it is hard to imagine that the parties have been unable to figure it out.  After all, 
the general contractors and subcontractors are typically active in both the public and 
private projects.  There should not be any learning impediment to their adopting a more 
efficient mode. My point is a modest one.  Outside the sealed bid, public contract world, 
the parties do have to deal with bid-shopping, and they somehow manage to do so.   
 
 Nor am I suggesting that all the arguments against the evils of shopping are 
bogus.  But it is clear that courts have been quite willing to accept the anti-shopping 
rhetoric without much thought.   Their willingness to accept it, however, appears to be 
context-sensitive.  Compare the following two characterizations of shopping.  The first 
concerns a naming statute; the second concerns an antitrust claim against a “bid 
depository.”37 
  
Bid shopping is the use of the low bid already received by the general 
contractor to pressure other subcontractors into submitting even lower 
bids. Bid peddling, conversely, is an attempt by a subcontractor to 
undercut known bids already submitted to the general contractor in order 
to procure the job. . . .  The statute is designed to prevent only bid 
shopping and peddling that takes place after the award of the prime 
contract. The underlying reasons are clear. Subsequent to the award of the 
prime contract at a set price, the prime contractor may seek to drive down 
his own cost, and concomitantly increase his profit, by soliciting bids 
lower than those used in computing his prime bid. When successful this 
practice places a profit squeeze on subcontractors, impairing their 
incentive and ability to perform to their best, and possibly precipitating 
bankruptcy in a weak subcontracting firm. . . . Bid peddling and shopping 
prior to the award of the prime contract foster the same evils, but at least 
have the effect of passing the reduced costs on to the public in the form of 
lower prime contract bids.38 
   * * * 
                                                 
37 See Section IV C. 
38 Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. 456 P.2d 975. 
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Plaintiffs' complaint states that the purpose of the Depository was to 
inhibit ‘bid peddling' which refers to the disclosure, for the purpose of 
obtaining a more favorable bid, by a general contractor of one 
subcontractor's bid to a competing subcontractor prior to award and the 
practice of ‘bid shopping’ which refers to such disclosure for the same 
purpose after an award has been made to a general contractor. Plaintiffs 
contend that defendant engaged in ‘bid peddling’ by soliciting lower 
subbids outside the Depository for the floor covering and painting work. 
Instead of being a vice, however, it is readily apparent that the practice 
defined as ‘bid peddling’ is illustrative of open price competition in its 
purest form. To the extent that general contractors disclose the lowest 
subbids to competing subcontractors and thereby induce the 
subcontractors to make still lower subbids, the general contractors are able 
to offer lower prime bids to the awarding authority. The awarding 
authority, the taxpayers in the case of public projects and consumers in 
other instances, are the true beneficiaries. To obtain the lowest possible 
bid is the object of competitive bidding.39 
 
 It is not uncommon for a court at one time and place to view things differently 
from a court at another time and place.  What is unusual about the two preceding 
paragraphs is that they come from the same court, a mere twenty months apart.  Both are 
en banc unanimous decisions of the California Supreme Court. Five of the six judges are 
the same—the only change is the replacement of Roger Traynor by Donald Wright.  The 
difference, it appears, is not in the facts. Nor would the single change in membership 
produce such a change.  Rather it depends on whether the judges are wearing their 
legislative interpretation hats (the legislature says it is bad, therefore, it is bad) or their 
antitrust hats (price competition is good). 
 
III. The Case Law 
 
A. Public Contracts 
 
Since Drennan was decided in 1958, it has been cited in 80% of the cases in which 
GC’s are suing subs, whereas Baird has been cited in less than 30%.40  Courts explicitly 
adopted Baird in only two cases, both prior to 1966.41  Decades after Drennan, in Home 
Electric Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. Hall and Underdown Heating and Air Conditioning 
Company42 the North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Baird rule, refusing to find a 
                                                 
39 Oakland-Alameda County Builders' Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Const. Co. 4 Cal.3d 354, 482 
P.2d 226, 93 Cal.Rptr. 602, 1971 Trade Cases P 73,524. Counsel for the winning side was William 
Orrick who had previously been Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division 
and who had published a paper three years earlier on bid depositories and antitrust.  See Orrick, 
Trade Associations are Boycott-Prone: Bid Depositories as a Case Study, 19 Hastings L.J. 505 
1967-1968. 
40 I have included cases in which a GC or sub sues a supplier.  
41 Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc, . 172 So.2d 239; and Tatsch v. Hamilton-
Erickson Mfg. Co, . 418 P.2d 187. 
42 86 N. C. App. 540. 
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contract or to apply promissory estoppel to a dispute; however, it cited neither Baird nor 
Drennan.  It turned the “injustice” rhetoric of the pro-Drennan cases and commentary on 
its head.  
 
Allowing a cause of action based on promissory estoppel in construction 
bidding also creates the potential for injustice. It forces the subcontractor 
to be bound if the general contractor uses his bid, even though the general 
contractor is not obligated to award the job to that subcontractor. The 
general contractor is still free to shop around between the time he receives 
the subcontractor's bid and the time he needs the goods or services, to see 
if he can obtain them at a lower price. 
 
Using the doctrine in this context is also inequitable in that it allows the 
general contractor to sue the subcontractor if the subcontractor is unable to 
perform after the contractor has used his bid, but before he has formally 
accepted the subcontractor's offer. The subcontractor, however, is 
powerless and has no grounds on which to sue the contractor if the 
contractor refuses to use the subcontractor for the actual work.43 
 
The court went on to assert, as Hand did, that if GC’s don’t like it, they can contract for 
irrevocability: “Finally, general contractors can avoid this problem entirely by securing a 
contract with the subcontractor at the outset, conditioned on a successful bid. Contractors 
should be responsible for protecting themselves without having to resort to the use of 
promissory estoppel for relief.”44 
 
 Drennan and promissory estoppel have carried the day.  Even so, the GC still has 
lost around one-quarter of the time.  In a handful of cases, the court finds that the sub’s 
bid did not amount to an offer.  There was no promise; it was only a quotation or an 
estimate. Or, if the sub’s bid “expressly stated or clearly implied that it was revocable at 
any time before acceptance,”45 then the GC could not claim to have relied upon its 
irrevocability.  Both of these are exemplified in Fletcher-Harlee v. Pote.  The court said: 
“Fletcher-Harlee's solicitation letter stipulated that bids must be held open for a minimum 
of 60 days and that subcontractors must agree to be accountable for the prices and 
proposals submitted. In response, Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc. submitted a written 
price quotation for providing the concrete for the project. Pote's ‘bid,’ however, did not 
conform to Fletcher-Harlee's terms; rather, it stipulated that its price quotation was for 
informational purposes only, did not constitute a ‘firm offer,’ and should not be relied 
on.”46   The court found for the sub, noting that “[t]he disclaimer language was in normal 
print in the last paragraph of Pote's one-page submission letter. Fletcher-Harlee does not 
                                                 
43 86 N. C. App. 540, 545. 
44 86 N. C. App. 540, 545. 
45 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958).  
 
46 Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Contractors, 482 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007). The decision cited neither 
Drennan nor Baird;  Drennan, was, however, cited in plaintiff’s brief.  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Contractors, 482 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (No. 06-2199).   
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argue that it was worded or presented in a deceptive manner.”47  I am always suspicious 
when a court uses that sort of language.  Does it mean that the GC was aware of the 
language and did not complain?  Or, more likely, they were unaware, but failed to make 
the argument?  If the bidding process was as frantic as it is often portrayed, it is doubtful 
that someone at the GC’s office bothered to read the disclaimer before submitting its bid. 
 
The court distinguished Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. Hagerman Const. Corp.48 
which refused to enforce a similar disclaimer: “The bid was on a Lyon's quotation form. 
On the bottom of the form, in small print, the following limitation is found: ‘This 
quotation is subject to final acceptance and approval by our home office at Aurora, 
Illinois and the further condition contained on the reverse side hereof.’ On the reverse 
side, in smaller print yet, eight conditions are found. One of these has relevance to this 
appeal: ‘This quotation may be withdrawn and is subject to change without notice after 
15 days from date of quotation.’ The specifications for the project, which Lyon 
admittedly read, required that bids remain open for 120 days.”49  In both instances, I 
suspect, the sub was attempting an end run around the GC’s determination of a period of 
irrevocability and was counting on the GC’s not reading the fine print when putting 
together its bid.  The courts seem to believe that the success of this ploy should hinge on 
the size of the print and the location of the disclaimer. 
 
The big wild card, however, is reliance.  That, coupled with the injustice proviso, 
gives courts tremendous discretion.  If the GC did not reasonably rely on the bid, wrote 
Traynor, his claim would fail:  “Of course, if plaintiff had reason to believe that 
defendant's bid was in error, he could not justifiably rely on it, and section 90 would 
afford no basis for enforcing it.”50  He added:  “a general contractor is not free to delay 
acceptance after he has been awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a better 
price. Nor can he reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a 
continuing right to accept the original offer.”51  If in the post-bid period the GC were to 
attempt to get better terms (or if GC’s typically do so), then a court might well conclude 
that it did not reasonably rely on the sub’s bid.  There are three major problem areas: (1) 
the GC should have known the bid was in error; (2) the GC proposed new terms; (3) 
GC’s in general, or this specific GC, are known to shop the bid, and/or the GC shopped 
the bid in this instance.  Any of these might be enough to defeat reliance.  I’ll consider 
these in turn. 
 
1. Known Error 
 
In Drennan, Traynor concluded that the GC should not have inferred an error 
“since there was usually a variance of 160 per cent between the highest and lowest bids 
                                                 
47 482 F.3d 247, 250 n.2. 
48 391 N.E.2d 1152. 
49 391 N.E. 2d 1152, 1153. 
50 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 761 (Cal. 1958).   
51 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958).   
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for paving in the desert around Lancaster.”52  What the GC should have known is a fact 
question, and in a few instances courts have found against the GC.  A court found a 125% 
difference acceptable on the basis of testimony by the GC that it is “not uncommon” to 
have differences between the low and high bids submitted by subcontractors that are 
“more than double.”53  Bid differences on which courts found reliance unreasonable 




 “It is undisputed that the customary practice in the construction industry is for the 
general contractor who is awarded a contract to enter into a written contract with the 
subcontractor, which written contract embraces far more than the price which the 
subcontractor has bid by telephone. The additional matters would include such things, as 
whether the subcontractor would furnish a bond, who would provide for insurance, how 
payments would be made and many other matters.”58  If a court were to deem these terms 
a material alteration of the sub’s offer, it could treat the proffered written contract as a 
counteroffer.   If the sub then were to reject the counteroffer, the GC would not be able to 
resurrect the original offer and the sub would be off the hook.   
 
Of the fifteen cases in which the sub proffered the counteroffer defense, the court 
accepted it in six, rejected it in seven and remanded59 in two.  The courts in some 
instances listed the non-conforming clauses and labeled them as either material or non-
material, although in most instances it is hard to tell how the court came to that 
conclusion.  For example, in one of the cases holding for the sub, the court recognized 
two clauses (among the seven) that made the GC’s written contract a counteroffer: 
“The sub-contract prohibited the sub-contractor from continuing to employ any person 
                                                 
52 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 761 (Cal. 1958).   
53 Powers Const. Co., Inc. v. Salem Carpets, Inc. 322 S.E.2d 30 
54 Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros. 387 P.2d 1000. 
55 I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co 817 N.E.2d 799. 
56 S. N. Nielsen Co. v. National Heat & Power Co., Inc. 337 N.E.2d 387; Maurice Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. 
Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp. 632 F.Supp. 1082 D.D.C.,1986. 
57 Tolboe Const. Co. v. Staker Paving & Const. Co. 682 P.2d 843.  “In an effort to prove that a large 
discrepancy between subcontract bids, such as that existing here, is highly unusual and is, moreover, 
indicative of error, defendant elicited testimony from eight individuals, all of whom had extensive 
experience in the asphalt paving and general construction industries, in respect to whether they had ever 
seen a discrepancy in subcontract bids as large as that shown here. All eight witnesses, including Kent 
Tolboe, president of plaintiff Tolboe Construction Company, and Joe Hansen, plaintiff's estimator, testified 
that they had never seen a disparity in bids for asphalt paving as large as the one existing in this dispute. 
Defendant further notes that the largest discrepancy seen by any of those witnesses was 100 percent, and 
the low bid in that particular instance was rejected.”  At 846. 
58Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Engineering Co.  92 Cal.Rptr. 799. 
59 “Here, it appears Lambert may have intended to be bound prior to the execution of a written agreement, 
while Houston may have intended to be bound only by a written agreement. However, because the AIA 
subcontract differed from Houston's bid on a number of terms, this could indicate that Lambert did not 
intend to contract on Houston's terms. Because different inferences are possible regarding the parties' 
intent, summary judgment was inappropriate.” Richard E. Lambert, Ltd. v. Houston Const. Co., Inc. Not 
Reported in P.3d, 2009 WL 2031920 (Ariz.App. Div. 1)  The second case, N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman 
Const. Co. 319 F.2d 736,   will be considered below at note ___. 
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deemed by the owner, architect or contractor to be a nuisance or a detriment to the job. . . 
[and]  the sub-contract authorized the architect to discharge any workman committing a 
nuisance upon certain parts of the premises.”60  It is hard to imagine that these would be 
deal-breakers.  There are instances of proof by adjective, labeling the new terms as 
onerous.61  In rejecting a GC’s claim, a trial judge concluded that the non-price terms 
were too important: “I've read this subcontract in its entirety and it contains so many 
agreements which in my opinion are absolutely essential to the performance of this job; 
that it would be, in my opinion, extremely unlikely that either Nielsen or National 
intended themselves to be contractually bound to each other until this particular written 
subcontract form had been completed and signed by both parties. There are many matters 
that go far beyond the bid price.”62 
 
 One tack for rejecting the counteroffer defense is simply to say that the non-
conforming clauses are not material.63  A second is to recognize that the sub regrets its 
original offer and is raising the issue opportunistically.  For example, in N. Litterio & Co. 
v. Glassman Const. Co.64 the sub’s president admitted that his refusal to go forward was 
based on price and had nothing to do with the additional terms: 
 
 When the prime contract was awarded to it Glassman sent Litterio a 
written proposed subcontract for the brick and masonry work to be done 
for the amount of Litterio's bid. The proposal contained various terms 
which, so far as the record shows, had not theretofore been the basis of 
any communication between the parties, including a provision that it was 
not valid unless signed and returned within ten days. . . .   Having become 
convinced that its bid was too low, Litterio let the ten days elapse without 
executing and returning the proposed subcontract. In the proceedings in 
the District Court the President of Litterio deposed, and the District Court 
found, that Litterio would have accepted the contract except for the error 
in estimating the cost of the work. The refusal to go ahead, in other words, 
was based on the price, not on other provisions in the proposed contract.65 
 
Nonetheless, since promissory estoppel is ordinarily a question of fact, the court 
remanded so that the case might go to trial. 
 
3. Bid Shopping 
                                                 
60 Hedden v. Lupinsky 405 Pa. 609, 176 A.2d 406. 
61 Hawkins Const. Co. v. Reiman Corp. 245 Neb. 131, 511 N.W.2d 113 (“appellant relied on appellee's 
expected acquiescence to certain nonstandard additional conditions which could be considered onerous”). 
Lahr Const. Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc. 168 Misc.2d 759, 640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (“[He]tried in his letter to 
extract new and onerous terms from Kozel that he knew from prior experience would not be accepted.“) 
62 S. N. Nielsen Co. v. National Heat & Power Co., Inc. 32 Ill.App.3d 941, 337 N.E.2d 387.  The Appellate 
Court decided against the GC on another ground, holding that the sub’s error was so obvious, the GC could 
not reasonably rely on it. 
63 Debron Corp. v. National Homes Const. Corp. 493 F.2d 352 (eleven terms); Crook v. Mortenson-Neal 
727 P.2d 297 (seven terms). 
64 319 F.2d 736. 
65 319 F. 2d 736, 739. 
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 Adding new, more onerous, terms can be characterized as a form of chiseling—
chopping the bid.  In most of the cases, however, it appears that the additional terms were 
simply language included in a GC’s form contract and that there was no attempt to 
rebargain, but that is not always clear from the court’s presentation of the facts.   When 
the rebargaining is explicitly about price, the chiseling issue is more squarely framed. 
There are two interrelated questions regarding GC’s attempting to renegotiate the price.  
First, is it meaningful to say that a GC relied on a sub’s bid if renegotiation in this market 
or by this GC is common?  And, second, should a GC that has attempted to renegotiate 
this particular contract be allowed to claim that it had reasonably relied.  If chiseling were 
endemic, one would expect reliance on a bid to be unreasonable.  Only a handful of 
opinions raised the question.  They do suggest that post-bid renegotiation is common, but 
that might just be a reflection on a small, nonrepresentative sample.66  In two instances 
the court recognized that shopping was common, but that there was no evidence of it in 
the specific case.  In a Minnesota case, the court noted that the sub contended “that ‘bid 
shopping’ and ‘bid chopping’ are so common to the Twin Cities area construction 
industry that prime contractors and subcontractors do not expect to be bound by prices 
submitted by the subcontractors to the prime contractors and that defendant was therefore 
not bound on its bid on the ventilation work because further and final negotiations would 
take place at a later time.”67  However, since there was no evidence that the GC had 
shopped this bid, the court found for the GC, holding that its reliance was reasonable.68    
 
For a most peculiar twist on the reliance argument consider this:  
 
 The facts of this case demonstrate precisely in what way the general 
contractor relied upon the bids of prospective subcontractors. As already 
indicated, the general contractor entered into several subcontracts at less 
than the original bid price, sometimes with the original bidder and 
sometimes not. In at least one case, the general contractor entered into a 
subcontract with someone who did not make the low bid, but at the exact 
price of the low bid. But in no case did the general contractor ever enter 
into a contract with a subcontractor or supplier at a price higher than the 
low bid. It is thus quite clear from the record that unless the general 
contractor negotiated a contract with another subcontractor or supplier at 
or below the low bid, the contract was made with the low bidder. 
Therefore it is obvious that the general contractor relied upon the low bids 
in the sense that those bids provided a protective ceiling on the cost of 
work to be contracted out to subcontractors and of supplies to be obtained 
from materialmen.69 
 
That is, the GC could shop the bid at will, so long as it ended up with a price at or below 
the sub’s bid.  If it failed to do better, it could still hold the sub to its bid.  That hardly 
                                                 
66 By looking only at litigated cases, I have a selection bias problem. 
67 Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc. 190 N.W.2d 71. 
68 See also Loranger Const. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co. 384 N.E.2d 176. 
69 Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Engineering Co. 92 Cal.Rptr. 799. 
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seems consistent with Traynor’s reasoning in Drennan, but it does exemplify the 
plasticity of the reasonable reliance concept.70 
 
 More in line with Drennan, two opinions found that bid shopping precluded a 
finding of reliance. 
 In accordance with industry practice of shopping for the lowest possible 
price after the bid selection, I & R determined to contact other dealers in 
an effort to secure the lowest possible price for the boilers. 
   * * * 
In concluding that there was no reliance, the trial judge found that I & R 
expressly reserved the right to shop among suppliers after the subcontract 
was awarded, and found that I & R admitted that it was actively seeking a 
better price, that reserving the right to shop the suppliers after a 
subcontractor is awarded a bid is standard practice in the industry, and that 
I & R did not intend to be bound by Hazelton's facsimile quote.71 
 
In a second opinion finding no reliance, the court said: “In fact, it is Complete General's 
customary practice to contact other subcontractors to determine whether they are willing 
to reduce their bids before Complete General awards a subcontract, a tactic commonly 
referred to as bid-shopping.”72 
 
 Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., Inc., 73 perhaps the oddest of the bid 
shopping cases, came to the right result, but the reasoning was bizarre.  The subcontract 
itself was for about 60% of the entire project.74  The sub, Johnson, made an error in 
calculating its bid; it did not inform Pavel (also called PEI) because PEI was not the low 
bidder.  However, after the low bidder was disqualified PEI received the contract.  It then 
sent the following fax to Johnson and its competitors: 
 
We herewith respectfully request that you review your bid on the above 
referenced project that was bid on 8/05/93. PEI has been notified that we 
will be awarded the project as J.J. Kirlin, Inc. [the original low bidder] has 
been found to be nonresponsive on the solicitation. We anticipate award 
on or around the first of September and therefor request that you supply 
the following information. 
 
1. Please break out your cost for the “POWERS” supplied control work as 
we will be subcontracting directly to “POWERS”. 
                                                 
70 It is not quite as crazy as it seems.  If a primary public concern is that favoritism would lead to higher 
prices, this would restrict post-bid behavior resulting in a higher price to a favored sub. However, this is a 
pretty awkward way of making that point.  For an economic analysis that treats the sub’s irrevocable offer 
as a cap, see Grosskopf & Medina, note ___, p. 238. 
71 I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co 817 N.E.2d 799. 
72 Complete Gen. Constr. Co. v. Kard Welding, Inc 911 N.E.2d 959. 
73 674 A.2d 521. 
74 Commentary on GC-sub disputes usually notes a power imbalance between large GC’s and small subs.  
Here, at least, the situation is reversed.  Ironically, the low bidder was disqualified because it did not 
qualify as a small business while Pavel did. 
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2. Please resubmit your quote deleting the above referenced item. 
 
We ask this in an effort to allow all prospective bidders to compete on an 
even playing field. 
 
A few days later PEI informed Johnson that it had accepted Johnson’s bid.  Johnson 
responded by saying that it had discovered a mistake in that bid, but had not informed 
PEI because it had assumed that PEI had not won the contract.75  Johnson declined to 
perform.  One month later, PEI was formally awarded the contract; it brought in a second 
sub at a higher price and sued Johnson for the difference. 
 
This should have been an easy case under Drennan.  The first point involved a 
change of scope and the second made clear that there would be a new round of bidding.  
A holding for PEI would mean that in the new bid for a differently configured project 
Johnson would be bound by its previous bid.  Somehow, the court, while holding for 
Johnson, found the reliance question to be “indisputably a close call.”76  The court then 
added a second reason for denying PEI.  Even if it found that PEI had accepted Johnson’s 
offer, that offer was subject to a condition precedent that PEI be awarded the contract.  
“Prior to the occurrence of the condition precedent, Johnson was free to withdraw.”77  On 
this reading, Johnson was free to revoke any time prior to the government formally 
awarding the contract to PEI, and since the formal award came nearly one month after 
Johnson revoked, it wins.  Given that there often is a temporal gap between the 
determination of the winning bidder and that bidder entering into a formal contract with 
the owner, this line of argument would undercut the reliance rationale.  The GC would 
remain bound to the owner, but in the interim period between the closing of the bid and 
the awarding of the primary contract, the sub would be free to walk. 
 
What to make of all this?  The Drennan standard has all the warts that Robert 
Scott and his various co-authors have cataloged for years.78  The GC’s reliance is a fact 
question, but there is not much theory to frame those facts.  That does not necessarily 
make it wrong.  Drennan is only a default rule and if it were completely out of touch, 
then we should expect parties to contract away from it.  There does not seem to be much 
evidence for that for public projects. There was a hint in the preceding discussion that 
contracting away from Drennan might not be a simple matter.  Even if the bid document 
were to say that a sub’s bid would be irrevocable for sixty days, a sub might in its bid 
negate that by including language limiting the period of irrevocability to a matter of days 
                                                 
75 The opinion does not state whether Johnson had submitted the same bid to the disqualified GC. Nor does 
it say why Johnson could claim that it had not heard of the original winner’s disqualification after it had 
received PEI’s fax. 
76 674 A.2d 521, 533. 
77674 A2d 521, 533.  In another use of the condition precedent ploy, the court found that a clause making 
the appointment of the sub subject to the approval of the architect and owner was a condition precedent.  “It 
is undisputed that at the time National withdrew its bid, the architect had not granted its approval.”  S. N. 




or hours.  In Section IV, I will return to the question of ex ante contracting. 
 
 B.  Non-Government Construction Contracts 
 
Three facts about the cases involving non-governmental owners stand out.  First, 
there are so few of them. The paucity of cases involving private projects suggests that in 
that context the parties have succeeded in contracting away from Drennan.  Second, the 
fairness justification—GC’s are legally bound to their bid with the public owner and so, 
therefore, should the subs be bound—doesn’t carry over to the private context.79 Third, 
with but one exception, the courts were entirely indifferent to the identity of the owner.  
Non-governmental owners showed up in about ten percent of the cases.  Some were large 
retailers engaged in major construction projects—Macy’s,80 Walmart,81 and Home 
Depot.82 In none does the court describe how the owner chose the GC; the implication is 
that it was a sealed bid process, but there is no reason to believe that to be true.  Nor is 
there any reason to believe that the GC had given the owner an irrevocable option.  The 
judicial indifference is illustrated by the fact that in a few of the decisions, the identity of 
the owner remained entirely unknown.  In only one case did the court appear to consider 
the difference between a public and private owner and in that case, it is fair to say, the 
discussion was muddled. 
 
We recognize that in public bidding cases the bidding process is governed by 
statute and that the legislative objectives of obtaining the lowest prices and 
establishing an honest and open procedure for competition for public contracts . . .  
are furthered by allowing the award of reasonable bid preparation costs for “the 
failure to give fair consideration to a bidder in accordance with the statutory 
procedure.”  To the extent that the decisions are based on an implied contract or on 
promissory estoppel, however, those bases for recovery may be equally applicable 
to private solicitations for bids. There is surely no policy which would be served by 
allowing solicitors of bids in the private sector to ignore the conditions they 
themselves set and ask others to rely upon.83 
 
There are two problems with that statement.  First, there is no reason to believe that the 
bases for recovery would be “equally applicable.”  The court does not consider what, if 
anything, might distinguish the public and private cases.  Second, it is not clear from the 
remainder of the discussion that the owner was in fact a private entity.  This might have 
been mere dicta.  The statement is followed by a footnote: “See, in another bidding 
context in the private sector, Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 
(1958).”  Since the owner in Drennan was, of course, a local school district, one cannot 
                                                 
79 Not all GC’s are so constrained; the legal constraints depend on the jurisdiction and the subject matter.  
80James King & Son, Inc. v. De Santis Const. No. 2 Corp. 413 N.Y.S.2d 78. 
81 MDH Builders, Inc. v. Nabholz Const. Corp. 17 S.W.3d 97. 
82 Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Const. L.L.C. 114 P.3d 835. 
83 New England Insulation Co. v. General Dynamics Corp. 522 N.E.2d 997.  In another case in which a sub 
successfully sued a supplier, the court noted “there was evidence that the Turner Construction Company 
did not, necessarily, have to award the contract to the lowest bidder.” Traco, Inc., a Three Rivers 
Aluminum Co. v. Arrow Glass Co., Inc. 814 S.W.2d 186 Tex.App.-San Antonio,1991.  For an illustration 
of a court holding 
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be confident that the owner in this case was in fact private.  So, the only case suggesting 
that there might be some difference between the public and private owner manages to put 
Drennan in the wrong box.  
 
Private owners do not have a direct interest in the GC-sub relationship.  Unless 
they have reasons for using a particular sub, they will be content with the GC’s 
evaluation of the subs and its means of choosing them.  Major construction projects 
nowadays are run by construction managers (a fancy name for general contractor) and the 
contracts typically have a guaranteed maximum price (GMP).  That is, they are partially 
cost-based with the GMP establishing a ceiling. The contracts allow for adaptation by 
including a mechanism for making, and pricing, change orders.84   Their concern would 
be the price, the quality and the speed with which the project can be completed.  To the 
extent that a private owner is able, it will convey to the GC its tradeoffs between these.  
Because they are so rarely litigated, the case law provides no insights into the process, 
and since one size does not fit all, one cannot generalize from the anecdotal material 
available.  Still, it appears that the typical pattern is that owners negotiate with GCs who 
simultaneously negotiate with subs, without firm commitments from the subs until the 
end.  That is, the GC engages in haggling with both the owner and the subs with the subs 
either providing estimates or irrevocable options with a short fuse.  
 
IV. The Case law:  Sub v GC 
 
If a sub submits the lowest bid, would the GC be estopped from selecting another 
contractor?  Where there are no other constraints on the GC’s discretion than contract 
law, the subs have invariably lost.  Traynor’s Southern California Acoustics decision 
(discussed above in Section I. C.) is an accurate statement of the default rule. General 
contractors rely on subs, but subs, it is said, do not rely on general contractors.  The 
default rule is not, however, where the action is.  In some instances subs have argued that 
they had successfully contracted for the contingent right to perform.  More significant are 
the extra-contractual constraints on the bidding process. In particular, many jurisdictions 
have adopted statutory restrictions on the GC-sub relationship and in some instances subs 
have set up private mechanisms—bid registries or depositories—to regulate the 
relationship.  The driving force behind these extra-contractual constraints is the sub’s 
concern with the so-called evils of bid shopping. 
 
 
A. The Default Rule 
 
The case for the asymmetric treatment of subs was made in Holman Erection Co. 
v. Orville E. Madsen & Sons, Inc.85 The sub, it wrote, does not rely on the general 
contractor:  
 
A subcontractor submits bids to all or most of the general contractors that 
                                                 
84 I am aware of at least one complex construction project in which the GMP was not finally set until the 
project was completed. 
85 330 N.W.2d 693. 
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it knows are bidding on a project. The subcontractor receives invitations to 
bid from some generals and submits bids to others without invitation. The 
time and expense involved in preparing the bid is not segregated to any 
particular general. The total cost is part of the overhead of doing business. 
The same bid is submitted to each general. Thus, whether or not any 
particular general wins the contract is of little or no concern to the 
subcontractor.86 
 
 The court noted further that, because of the way bids are typically prepared, the 
sub and GC are under very different pressures:  “The subcontractors have the luxury of 
preparing their bids on their own timetable, subject only to the deadline for submitting 
their bids to the general contractors. The same bid goes to all the general contractors and 
covers the same work. The generals, on the other hand, are dealing with all the various 
construction aspects of the project and with numerous potential subcontractors.” The GC, 
as noted above, gives the owner an irrevocable option.87 
  
 Moreover, binding the GC would limit its flexibility.  Specifically, since the GC 
“was forced to juggle the subcontracts in order to comply with the MBE regulations,”88 
the GC had to replace at least one named sub with a minority-owned firm.  Although the 
court does not spell this out, the flexibility gives the GC a second round to meet statutory 
constraints.  Rather than trying to put together the appropriate mix of minority and small 
business concerns (and any other mandated types) in their initial bid, the winning GC 
can, in effect, hold a separate post-bid competition between them. MBE firms from 
different categories would compete against each other—minority electrical 
subcontractors would compete with tile subcontractors, cement subcontractors, and 
others.  Regardless of whether one finds any or all of these arguments compelling, 
Holman is an accurate statement of the law.  More precisely, of contract law, for, as we 
shall see, much of the action is outside the scope of contract law. 
 
 In a few decisions the courts refused to find a contract invoking arguments that 
would have led to denial of a GC claim against the sub. Without raising any reliance 
issues, two courts invoked the mirror image rule when declining to find a contract: 
 
 
In the absence of agreement to essential terms, such as bonding, penalty 
                                                 
86 330 N.W. 2d 693, 698. 
87 Statutes typically limit the GC’s ability to renegotiate the price with the government agency.  Some 
states give the GC some leeway, allowing the GC to revise or drop out without penalty if it could show that 
its bid was mistaken.  “In Florida a general contractor may obtain equitable relief from a bid containing a 
unilateral mistake.” Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc. 172 So.2d 239, 242 Fla.App., 
1965.  California granted some relief if the bidder had made a clerical error. In Diede Const., Inc. v. 
Monterey Mechanical Co. 125 Cal.App.4th 380, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 763, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,360, 2004 
Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,303 Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004 the sub argued that because it had made a clerical error, 
the GC’s mitigation should have required that it request relief from the government.  The court rejected the 
argument holding that for the statutory exceptions to apply, the error had to be committed by the GC, not 
by the sub. 
88330 N.W. 2d 693, 699.  MBE stands for Minority Business Enterprise. 
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provisions, manner of payment, and work progress completion dates, it 
can readily be seen that the plaintiff and the defendant must have intended 
to set out those particulars (and others) in the written contract which was 
to be executed at a later date. (Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts)89 
 
The depositions here also show that even if plaintiff's dollar amount had 
been acceptable to defendant, other material provisions of a written 
contract, including conditions and bonding terms, would have had to be 
agreed upon. The bid submitted by plaintiff in this case was not capable of 
being acted upon without reference to these matters so could not be 
considered complete in any event.  (O. C. Kinney, Inc. v. Paul Hardeman, 
Inc).90 
 
It is not clear that these courts would have found a lack of an agreement had the suit been 
brought by the GC.91  A court might have concluded, as in III A 2, that there was no 
contract, but that a GC could recover under promissory estoppel.  Neither court 
considered an estoppel theory.  
 
 Suppose that prior to the bid the GC had agreed that if it were the low bidder and 
it had used the sub’s bid in preparing its own, then it would use the sub for the project.  In 
Electrical Const. & Maintenance Co., Inc. v. Maeda Pacific Corp.92 the sub alleged an 
oral agreement claiming that it was “unwilling to bid unless [the GC] agreed to award [it] 
the subcontract if it were the lowest bidder on the subcontract and [the GC] were the 
successful bidder on the prime contract.”93  In reversing the dismissal of the sub’s claim, 
the court held that there was consideration for the GC’s promise, namely the sub’s 
submission of a bid.  Whether there actually was such an oral agreement was a fact 
question to be determined on remand. 
 
 One sub alleged that it had agreed to give the GC “protection,” that is, submit 
inflated bids to all the GC’s competitors, and in return, the GC promised to give it the 
deal if  the GC were the low bidder.94   The trial court held that there was no contract and 
                                                 
89 67 Wash.2d 514, 408 P.2d 382 
90 151 Colo. 571, 379 P.2d 628.   
91 Another case relied on extensive negotiations rather than on the content of the written agreements. “This 
case bristles with indicia of negotiation. In the very first instance of contact between the parties after the 
offer was made, MCS proposed an arrangement considerably different than that which was submitted by 
Gunderson. From that point on, all further contact between the litigants came to nothing more than offers 
and counter-offers. MCS certainly manifested an intention to enter into a contract with Gunderson at some 
time in the future, and MCS may very well have taken advantage of Gunderson, but contract with 
Gunderson it did not.” Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros. Engineering Corp. 305 F.2d 
659.  That court quoted an earlier decision affirming the mirror image rule: “The principle which demands 
of an offeree precise and literal compliance with the requirements of the offer is generally and in 
Washington thought to be both fundamental and inflexible. Nothing else or less can be an acceptance; the 
power created by an offer is a strictly limited one, to be exercised only within the confines of the offeror's 
request.”  At 663, n.8. 
92 764 F.2d 619 C.A.9 (Guam),1985. 
93 764 F.2d 619, 620. 
94 Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co. 422 F.2d 1132, 1970 Trade Cases P 73,186 C.A.Ill. 1970. 
 27
even if a contract had been formed, it would have been illegal.  On appeal the court did 
not have to deal with the latter question, holding that no contract had been formed.  In  
New England Insulation Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.95 the GC promised that bids 
would be retained in a locked file and only opened after the bid closing date.  However, 
in a kickback scheme, some of its officers revealed the content of one sub’s bid to 
another which then won the bid.  Overturning a dismissal, the court held that “an 
invitation to bid upon certain conditions followed by the submission of a bid on those 
conditions creates an implied contract obligating the bid solicitor to those conditions.”96 
 
 Notwithstanding these exceptions, the asymmetric treatment of the sub’s claims 
remains the dominant contract law outcome.  Sub’s have attempted to overcome this 
asymmetry by group action, either through legislation or through private organizations 
like bid depositories. 
 
 B.  Statutes  
 
 In Southern California Acoustic, Traynor presented two generations of California 
“naming” statutes.97  The earlier statute simply required the GC to list all subs with more 
than 0.5 percent of the total cost. To replace the named sub, the GC would have to get 
permission from the owner.  If a GC were to offer the owner a better price-quality deal, 
nothing in the statute would prevent the owner from approving the substitution.  So, 
while the statute gave the sub some assurance, it did not protect it from post-bid 
shopping.  The revised statute, as noted above at note __, made replacement of the named 
sub more difficult. 
 
 The extent of protection varies between jurisdictions and even within jurisdictions 
as the rules can differ for different agencies or different types of projects.  A Kentucky 
decision illustrates a weak naming statute: 
 
The requirement for listing is set out in the “Instruction to Bidders” and 
“General Conditions” issued to all prospective general contractors, which 
documents state that the name of each proposed subcontractor shall be 
submitted with the proposal and that no subcontractor may be employed or 
substituted without the approval of the Department of Finance, Division of 
Contracting & Administration. The sole evidence herein relating to this 
procedure is that the requirement has the purpose of assisting the Division 
in its evaluation of bids, and other portions of the above documents 
specifically provide that no contractual relationship shall arise between the 
Division and the subcontractor by submission of its name by the general 
contractor.98 
 
Despite a dissent decrying bid shopping, the court held that the statute did not give rise to 
                                                 
95 26 Mass.App.Ct. 28, 522 N.E.2d 997 Mass.App.Ct.,1988. 
96 At 31 & 999. 
97 See text at ___.  These are variously called “naming” or “listing” statutes.  
98 Finney Co., Inc. v. Monarch Const. Co., Inc. 670 S.W.2d 857, 858 Ky.,1984. 
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a contractual relationship. 
 
The basic question confronting this court is whether the incorporation of 
the name and amount of bid of a subcontractor by a general or prime 
contractor in its bid to the owner constitutes an acceptance which would 
create a contractual relationship between the general contractor and the 
subcontractor should the general contractor become the successful bidder. 
Our answer is that in the absence of a contrary statute, it does not. We are 
unable to find a single case to the contrary.99 
 
 Other jurisdictions give the sub a lot more protection.  The second generation 
California statute discussed above100 is one example.  Hoel-Steffen Const. Co. v. U. S.,101  
a case concerning a federal naming clause provides a nice illustration of the type of 
clause and the difficulty one might have in avoiding the obligation to use the named sub, 
even when both parties would like to. The naming clause permitted a change of 
subcontractors only if the contracting officer [CO] approved.  It stated that the contractor 
must list its subcontractors and may make a change only with the CO's consent in 
accordance with paragraph 17.10 of the subcontractor's listing clause which states: 
 
No substitutions for the individuals or firms named will be permitted 
except in unusual situations and then only upon the submission in writing 
to the Contracting Officer of a complete justification therefor and receipt 
of the Contracting Officer's written approval. The Contractor shall not be 
entitled to any increase in the contract price if substitution is authorized. 
However, the contract price shall be reduced if the Contractor's cost of 
performing the work is decreased as a result of approval of the 
subcontractor's substitution. In the event the Contracting Officer finds that 
substitution is not justified, the Contractor's failure or refusal to proceed 
with the work by or through the named subcontractor shall be grounds for 
termination of the contract under the provisions of Clause 5 of the General 
Provisions.102 
 
 The Procurement Regulations provided a non-exhaustive list of nine factors 
(including bankruptcy, loss of license, failure to furnish a performance bond) that would 
define an unusual situation.  In putting together its bid, the low bidder made an error.  It 
requested that it be replaced by another bidder and stated that it would pay the difference.  
(Its costs would have exceeded its bid price by around $200,000 and the alternative sub 
would have performed the job for only $46,000 more.)  However, the contracting officer 
declined to find the circumstances unusual and refused; the sub then performed the job 
and sued the government claiming, successfully, that the contracting officer’s decision 
was arbitrary and capricious.  The court recognized that a principal purpose of the 
                                                 
99 Finney Co., Inc. v. Monarch Const. Co., Inc. 670 S.W.2d 857, 859 Ky.,1984. 
100 At ___. 
101 231 Ct.Cl. 128, 684 F.2d 843, 30 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 70,268. 
102 Hoel-Steffen Const. Co. v. U. S. 231 Ct.Cl. 128, 684 F.2d 843, 30 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 70,268 
(emphasis added). 
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regulation was to prevent bid shopping, and, since there was no shopping here, the 
contracting officer should have permitted the substitution.103  
 
 In the course of interpreting a Nevada listing statute, a federal court relied on the 
legislature’s purpose and similar statutes in other states.104  The statute required that 
general contractors bidding on public works projects list the major subcontractors and 
circumscribed the grounds upon which the subs could be removed.105  The sub could be 
replaced if the awarding authority objected to the sub.  “Absent an objection by the 
awarding authority, a listed subcontractor may be replaced only with the approval of the 
awarding authority, which approval may be granted only on [certain] grounds.”106  The 
one contested ground was the refusal of the sub to execute a written contract “with the 
same terms that all other subcontractors on the project were offered.”107  A literal 
reading of that language, said the court, would lead to an absurdity—electrical 
subcontractors would have to agree to the same terms as cement subcontractors and so 
forth.  The court interpreted this to mean that the contract terms had to be in “reasonable 
conformity.”108  It also looked to what other states had done to deal with the “evils of bid-
shopping”: “But the court need not construe in a vacuum: At the time the Nevada 
Legislature enacted S.B. 474, numerous other states had adopted subcontractor listing 
statutes; indeed it seems from the considerable similarity of language among these 
statutes to be likely that Nevada copied its listing statute from that of another state.”109 
 
The court noted similar statutes in Delaware, Alaska, Connecticut, California, and 
New Mexico.  It granted the sub a preliminary injunction, rejecting the GC’s attempt to 
replace it with the one other bidder.  It noted, with disapproval, the testimony of the 
state’s contracting officer that the state had no obligation to investigate the grounds for 
removal asserted by the GC.110  The defendant took an even more extreme position:  “Mr. 
Ron Krump, testified that he believed the statute imposed absolutely no limits on post-
award negotiations between a winning general contractor and its listed subcontractors. In 
Krump's view, the terms of the subcontract bid, and the fact that a general contractor 
makes use of the sub-bid in its own prime bid, have no relevance to, and do not in any 
way restrict the scope of, post-award negotiations.”111  In determining that the sub’s 
behavior in the post-bid negotiations was reasonable, the court cited the testimony of the 
sub: “listed subs should be prepared to negotiate subcontract terms which depart from the 
terms of a sub's bid by as much as five per cent of the total sub-bid price.”112  Thus, even 
                                                 
103 At 849. 
104 Clark Pacific v. Krump Const., Inc. 942 F.Supp. 1324 D.Nev.,1996. 
105 “The drive to enact state statutes requiring listing of subcontractors on public works project, and limiting 
the grounds for post-award substitution of listed subcontractors, came about at least in part because of 
pressure from subcontractors' trade associations, . . .  The Nevada State Senate approved S.B. 474 by a vote 
of 20-1-0; the Nevada State Assembly approved the bill by a vote of 42-0-0.”  At ___. 
106 At 1340. 
107 At 1340. (emphasis added by court) 
108 At 1342. 
109 At 1341 
110 At 1351-52.  Note the similarity with the contracting officer’s interpretation in Hoel-Steffen. (at note 
___) 
111 At 1344.   
112 At 1345. 
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in a state with tight restrictions on bid shopping, the sub testified that it was the norm, 
within a certain range.  Because the GC was insisting on terms outside that range, the 
court held for the sub. 
 
In the Nevada case, the court granted a preliminary injunction, delaying the 
beginning of construction.  A similar defense by the GC was rejected in a case under the 
Massachusetts listing statute.113  The GC argued that the statute allowed it to reject a sub 
without giving any reason.  It replaced the sub and the job was performed by a 
competitor.  The first sub sued and the trial court awarded it the costs of bid preparation.  
On appeal, the court deemed this inadequate for deterrence and awarded anticipated 
profits.114  
 
 While some courts have interpreted the statutes to apply to any post-bid 
attempts to negotiate, others have held that negotiating with the chosen sub was 
okay.  
 
Under New York Public Bid Law, which is essentially the same as 
Louisiana's, the courts have distinguished between post-bid negotiations 
with the original low bidder and negotiations with others, which could 
lead to the hiring of a contractor other than the original low bidder. . . .  
These courts have reasoned that post-bid negotiations with the announced 
lowest bidder are not inconsistent with the policy of avoiding favoritism; 
negotiating with any other bidder, on the other hand, directly contravenes 
the policy.115  
 
It is not clear whether this distinction matters very much.  After all, if the GC has no 
outside alternative and is bound to owner, it’s bargaining leverage is limited at best. 
 
Two California decisions illustrate variations on the listing statutes.  The former 
ups the ante, the latter suggests one way of gaming the law.  In MCM Const., Inc. v. City 
& County of San Francisco,116 the plaintiff GC was disqualified as non-responsive 
because it failed to list all subcontractors and the dollar amounts for each accounting for 
more than one-half of one percent of the total, and to indicate which of the firms, if any, 
were Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) and Woman-owned Business Enterprise 
(WBE).  The disappointed sub argued to no avail that the city could not impose 
conditions over and above those embodied in the state listing statute.  Although the court 
                                                 
113Roblin Hope Industries, Inc. v. J. A. Sullivan Corp. 6 Mass.App.Ct. 481, 377 N.E.2d 962 
Mass.App.,1978.. 
114 Recovery for lost profits is unusual. Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. 
Authority 23 Cal.4th 305, 1 P.3d 63, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4657, 2000 Daily Journal 
D.A.R. 6173 Cal.,2000.  (“Indeed, while a few courts have stated in dicta that lost profits are a proper 
measure of damages when bad faith is demonstrated, only two cases have been brought to our attention in 
which lost profits were, as in this case, actually awarded to a disappointed bidder.”) 
115 Percy J. Matherne Contractor, Inc. v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co. 915 F.Supp. 818, 107 
Ed. Law Rep. 665 E.D.La.,1995. 
116 66 Cal.App.4th 359, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 44, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6828, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9329 
Cal.App. 1 Dist.,1998. 
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did not put it this way, San Francisco could if it so chose, pay more for construction to 
satisfy other social goals. 
 
In Thompson Pacific Const., Inc. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.117 the GC, 
Thompson, took advantage of an exception in the statute.  The GC could reject the sub if, 
after a reasonable time, the sub refuses to enter into a written contract at the price 
specified in the sub’s bid.  The school district claimed, almost certainly correctly, that 
Thompson  
 
had violated the Act by listing with its prime contractor bid “placeholder” 
subcontractors (that is, subcontractors who had not submitted a bid for the 
work for which they were listed) or “captive” subcontractors (owned and 
controlled by Thompson). After Thompson was awarded the prime 
contract, the District argued, Thompson sought to find the lowest price it 
could from other subcontractors, and then requested permission to 
substitute the newly-found subcontractor with the placeholder or captive 
subcontractor on the grounds that the listed subcontractor had failed or 
refused to sign a subcontract.118 
 
If all the subs refuse to sign the contract, then Thompson would be free to 
negotiate each subcontract unconstrained by the statute—that is, to shop, just as if this 
were a non-government project.  Thompson argued that these were not placeholders and 
it just happened that each of the subs was offered the work but declined.  The key to 
making this ploy work is the willingness of the District to accept the substitution. It could 
have refused the replacement and if Thompson failed to put together a team, from the 
listed subs, it could have replaced Thompson.  Or it could have fined him for violating 
the Act. “When Thompson requested substitutions of six of its listed subcontractors, the 
District clearly had the authority to investigate the reasons for the substitutions, to 
determine whether Thompson had violated the Act, and to cancel the contract or impose 
penalties if it found such a violation. The District declined to exercise this authority, for 
the perfectly sound reason that no listed subcontractor objected to the proposed 
substitutions.”119 So, the strategy is not without risks.120  Notice, however, that by 
“accepting” bogus bids Thompson was, in effect, incorporating into its bid its own 
judgment as to the costs of the six subcontracts.  In at least this instance a GC had more 
confidence in its judgment (and ex post bargaining ability) than in the price discovery of 
the sealed bid process. 
 
C.  Bid Depositories 
 
 The GC-sub relationship is further constrained by the use of bid depositories.  
Subcontractor trade associations have established depositories throughout the country.  
                                                 
117 Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2010 WL 298279 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.) Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2010. 
118 At 2. 
119 At 5. 
120 An additional risk is that the opinion is unpublished and, under California’s rules, cannot be cited, so it 
has no precedential value. 
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These have often run afoul of the antitrust laws, but they continue to exist in one form or 
another.  The basic structure has been characterized in this way by one commentator:  
 
A ‘locked box’ procedure is the most common method of depository 
operation. Subcontractors wishing to bid to one or more general 
contractors on a certain job submit bids in sealed envelopes to the 
depository. An envelope containing a bid addressed to each general 
contractor to whom the subcontractor wishes to bid is placed in the 
‘locked box,’ and another envelope containing a copy of that bid is 
addressed to the depository itself and similarly deposited in the box or 
another secure receptacle. There will be a cut-off point, typically 4 hours 
or so before the prime bid opening time (i.e., the time by which all bids 
must be submitted to the owner or awarding authority), and after that cut-
off point (or depository closing time) is reached, no more bids may be 
received, and none received may be amended or withdrawn. 
 
Promptly at the depository closing time, the locked box is opened, and the 
envelopes contained therein are dispensed to the general contractors to 
whom addressed. Each general contractor then prepares his own bid to the 
owner or awarding authority based upon the subbids received and his 
estimates of his own work costs.121 
 
If all the subs in a trade are required to place their bids through the depository, 
and if the rules preclude any sub’s revising its bid, then there would be no room for post-
bid chiseling.  The process identifies the low bidder and all the others are estopped from 
altering theirs.  From the point of view of the subs, this would kill two birds with one 
stone.  The locked box maintains confidentiality for the bid so that there could be no pre-
bid free riding and the restriction on amending or withdrawing bids means that there 
could be no post-bid shopping.   
 
However, a depository that bound all subs in a trade to use it and be bound by its 
rules would violate the antitrust laws.  So, subcontractors have tried to accomplish almost 
the same thing with rules that are less stringent.  Some succeed, many don’t.  George H. 
Schueller  produced a compilation of federal antitrust prosecutions from the late 1930’s to 
the late 1950’s.122  Despite a significant California Supreme Court ruling in 1971 that a 
bid depository’s rules were illegal per se, depositories continue to survive in modified 
forms.123  If GC’s could only use subs that submitted bids to the depository, that would be 
                                                 
121 Orrick, Trade Associations Are Boycott-Prone-Bid Depositories As A Case Study (1968) 19 Hastings 
L.J. 505, 520.)  Orrick was counsel for the defendant subcontractor in Oakland-Alameda County Builders' 
Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Constr. Co. 4 Cal.3d 354, 482 P.2d 226, 93 Cal.Rptr. 602, 1971 Trade Cases P 
73,524 Cal. 1971, in which the court held the depository rules to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 
122 Bid Depositories, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 497 1959-1960.  For a decision upholding a depository, see 
Associated Plumbing Contractors of Marin, Sonoma and Mendocino Counties, Inc. v. F. W. Spencer & 
Son, Inc. 213 Cal.App.2d 1, 28 Cal.Rptr. 425 Cal.App. 1963. 
123 Oakland-Alameda County Builders' Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Constr. Co. 4 Cal.3d 354, 482 P.2d 226, 
93 Cal.Rptr. 602, 1971 Trade Cases P 73,524 Cal. 1971. 
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a clear violation.  Various means of enforcing the use of the depository short of formal 
requirements have been deployed and some have weathered the antitrust challenge.   
 
My concern here is not with the subtleties of antitrust compliance.  Rather, it is to 
underscore the point that the sub’s bid takes place within specific contexts.  Under a 
depository system, the sub’s bid would almost always be irrevocable; promissory 
estoppel would be irrelevant.  If the depository rules were relaxed enough to grant sub’s 
some freedom to withdraw, a Drennan-type rule would impose an additional restriction 
on that freedom.  In effect, by invoking injustice, the court could enhance the anti-
competitive effects of the depository, contrary to the purpose of relaxing the depository’s 
rules.   
  
D. Summing Up 
 
 So, while the contract doctrine holds that the sub’s bid is irrevocable (subject to 
reliance/injustice), but the GC is not bound, the doctrine is often trumped by pro-
subcontractor statutes or by extra-contractual mechanisms (like bid depositories).  Subs 
complain about the evils and immorality of shopping, but absent such restrictions, it 
seems clear that post-bid negotiation would be common.  Indeed, even with many of 
those restrictions in place, post-bid negotiation appears to be common.  I am quite 
confident that the negotiation would be so common that it would not adversely affect the 
reputations of GC’s or subs that engaged in it.  After all, the subs and GC’s also work on 
projects for private owners in which the subcontracts are negotiated.  Since haggling is 
the norm in that context, it is unlikely that the same behavior would be anathema in the 
public competitive bidding context. 
 
 Suppose that neither regulations nor depositories constrained post-bid 
negotiations.  That is the implicit assumption of most of the post-Drennan cases.  A 
second implicit assumption is that the parties are incapable of figuring it out for 
themselves.  While Learned Hand had suggested that the parties could deal with this by 
pre-bid contracting,124 much of the case law treats this as impractical because it would 
require multiple contingent contracts with subs.  Recall that in two cases discussed above 
at notes ___-___, the GC’s solicitation stated that the bids be irrevocable for a period of 
time, but that the sub’s form stated that the bid could not be relied on; and in one of the 
cases, the ploy worked.  I would think that this problem could be resolved either by 
tweaking contract doctrine or by designing the sealed bid regulations so that GC’s could 
establish in the bid requests the extent to which the sub’s bid would be irrevocable.  If in 
its solicitation of bids the GC could state that a condition for having a bid considered was 
that the sub accept its terms and that submission of a bid constituted acceptance of the 
GC’s terms, the multiple contract problem would be resolved—if the courts would honor 
the clause. The GC would be offering a unilateral contract that the sub would accept by 
submitting a bid.  That should be sufficient to avoid the mirror image problem in which 
the sub submits a bid conditional on a different set of terms.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
124 See text at note ____.  He rejected finding a contract by implication since, he claimed, the parties were 
perfectly capable of contracting explicitly if they so chose. 
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 Assuming that the courts could avoid this ploy, the GC could determine 
unilaterally whether the sub’s bid would be irrevocable and whether it would have the 
freedom to shop post-bid.125  If it so desired, it could give itself a pure option—the sub 
offer is irrevocable, GC is free to shop.  As noted above, the option is valuable for the 
GC, and costly for the sub to provide. The GC must recognize that ultimately it must pay 
for the option—the more one-sided the arrangement, the more it must pay.  If the terms 
favor the GC too much, subs might refuse to bid or submit bids that convey little 
information.  I suspect that in many (most?) contexts, GC’s would find that an 
irrevocable option, even one modified by the Drennan rule would give them more 
protection than they needed and they would opt for less.  That is, if parties were free to 
bargain over the issue (no statutory constraints, no worry about enforceability) they 
would most likely arrive at the Baird solution. 
 
V.  Beyond Construction 
 
 A.  Drennan 
 
 Once we get beyond the GC v sub and sub v GC cases (or when one of them is 
suing a supplier), there’s not much left of Drennan.126  Only three cases outside the 
construction context did much to extend Drennan’s reach. In Aronowicz v. Nalley's, 
Inc.,127 Nalley’s, a food distributor, encouraged plaintiffs to develop a sliced meat 
business (Major), describing in some detail the future relationship between the parties. 
Nalley’s would be the exclusive distributor in Los Angeles and Orange County.  Major 
spent over $100,000 getting the business up and running. 
 
On June 16, 1965, Gardiner [the local Nalley’s manager] wrote to an 
executive in Nalley's home offices in the state of Washington. . . .   He 
described the product and its packaging in favorable terms. He stated that 
Nalley's would increase the sales of its own products in its Los Angeles 
District by $100,000 a year by adding the Major line, converting now 
unprofitable retail accounts to profitable ones. He went into detail about the 
financial benefits to defendant and stated that he personally and the sales 
organization were enthusiastic. 
 
                                                 
125 If the unilateral contract argument fails, states could legislate it, if they so chose.  The model for such 
legislation already exists: UCC §2-205.  Of course, the fact that legislatures have not done so suggests that 
the public choice problem is not so easily overcome. 
126 It shows up in the well-known case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc 133 N.W.2d 267 as part of a list 
of cases supporting the proposition that relief has been granted for promissory estoppel.  In another case, 
the court distinguished Drennan in finding that a conditional commitment letter from a lender did not give 
rise to a claim of promissory estoppel.  (Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 131 
Cal.Rptr. 836 Cal.App. 1976).  In Steiner v. Thexton, 163 Cal.App.4th 359, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 08 Cal. 
Daily Op. Serv. 6517, 2008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7778 Cal.App. 3 Dist.,2008, Drennan played a tangential 
role. When the seller of property refused to convey, the court found there was no contract (the agreement 
was illusory) and also rejected a promissory estoppel claim. The court distinguished Drennan by noting 
that in this case only one party, the buyer, had a right to revocation.   
127 30 Cal.App.3d 27, 106 Cal.Rptr. 424,1973-1 Trade Cases P 74,365 Cal.App. 1972.  
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Apparently Washington thought otherwise. Whatever the reason, on June 22, 
1965 Gardiner telephoned Duncan and stated that defendant was not going to 
distribute Major's products. He gave no reason. . . .  
 
Disaster resulted to Major. Immediate efforts were made to secure other 
distribution, handicapped by the fact that in light of the Nalley's 
distributorship Major had not developed a sales organization as such, and 
owned no trucks in which to distribute by itself. . . .   Although some sales 
were made through a food broker, and a few other sources, the business 
faltered. In little more than six months it was through. . . . .With no market for 
its products Major defaulted on its various commitments to equipments 
suppliers and others. Machinery was foreclosed and repossessed. The 
individual plaintiffs and others were sued by a bank on guarantees which they 
had executed, eventually settling the claims.128 
 
The court held for the plaintiff, blurring the theories of liability.  It did not find it 
necessary to decide whether liability arose under contract or under promissory estoppel.  
Perhaps, it said, an exchange of letters established a bilateral agreement.  Or maybe 
Nalley’s letter might have been an offer to enter into a unilateral contract which was 
accepted when Major built its plant.  Or, citing Restatement Section 45 and Drennan, it 
could have found a subsidiary promise not to revoke its offer.  The court does not explain 
why it is a good idea to encourage investment of substantial funds in a business when the 
survival of that business hinges on a not-yet consummated distribution arrangement. 
 
Strata Production Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co.129 concerned the enforceability 
of a “farmout” agreement for oil.  “A farmout agreement is an assignment of a lease and 
drilling rights by a lease-owner not interested in drilling to another operator interested in 
drilling. The primary characteristic of a farmout agreement is that the assignee is 
obligated to drill one or more wells on the assigned acreage as a prerequisite to the 
completion of the assignment.”130  Strata entered into farmout agreements on three 
adjacent properties.  One of the agreements was with Mercury which would convey 
100% of the “working interest” to Strata.131   The agreement gave Strata the option, but 
not the obligation, to drill a test well within 120 days.  If it failed to do so, the agreement 
                                                 
128 At 429-30.  The court upheld the damages verdict although there was at least some reason to question 
how the jury got there.  “This juror told counsel that the million dollar verdict was based upon the 
assumption that there were about 100 shareholders of Major and one million dollars seemed about right for 
that number of shareholders; the juror further said that if the jury had known there were fewer shareholders 
the verdict would have been less. Aside from the fact that counsel's declaration is the rankest kind of 
hearsay, the matter recited does not at all show that a verdict was reached by chance.” (At 432)   In fact, 
there were only two shareholders. 
 
129 121 N.M. 622, 916 P.2d 822, 133 Oil & Gas Rep. 85, 1996 -NMSC- 016 N.M.,1996. 
130 At 825. 
131 “The working interest is the right to exploit the oil and gas in the leased land. Working interest owners 
are entitled to a proportionate share of profits from the oil extraction but are responsible for paying the 
costs of that extraction. A grant of 100% of the working interest gives the lessee the exclusive right to 
exploit the minerals in the land.” ( At 825)  There was also a problem with the “net revenue interest,” but to 
simplify the discussion we can ignore that.  
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would terminate.  Strata paid nothing for the option.  Mercury warranted that it owned the 
entire working interest, when, in fact, it did not.  Strata went ahead with the drilling and 
sued Mercury for its damages—the revenues lost because it did not have the entire 
working interest.   
 
Mercury argued that this was only a unilateral contract and could be accepted 
only by performance. Prior to performance it was revocable. Because Strata learned of 
the error before it began drilling on this tract, Mercury argued, Mercury was free to 
revoke.  Under Restatement Second §45, partial performance by Strata would have made 
the unilateral agreement enforceable, but Strata’s drilling on this tract would have been 
too late.   The court distinguished the partial performance theory from promissory 
estoppel, in which the action or forbearance rendering the offer irrevocable need not be 
the initiation of performance under the contract.  The court cited Drennan, as well as 
Restatement Sections 90 and 87(2), in arguing that the elements of promissory estoppel 
made Mercury’s offer irrevocable.  Strata’s action in reliance upon the offer, the court 
held, was to commence drilling on one of the adjacent tracts.  The rationale for this was 
that the tracts were from the same geologic formation and evidence from one test drilling 
would indicate the likely productivity of the Mercury tract; drilling a wildcat well was 
risky and expensive (over $600,000) and it might not have been undertaken but for the 
Mercury farmout.  Hence, “Strata's reliance served as a consideration substitute for the 
option contract, which in turn made the underlying unilateral contract irrevocable and 
unmodifiable for the time allotted by the option.”132  This is the clearest extension of the 
Drennan rule outside the construction context. 
 
 Roel Const. Co., Inc. v. Fladeboe Automotive Group, Inc133 involved a 
construction contract, but it presented a very different problem and Drennan played a 
very different role.  The owner was a private firm and the procurement mechanism was 
far from a competitive sealed bid.  The contract was for the construction of an automobile 
showroom and the dispute was between the dealership and the general contractor (Roel).  
“The parties entered into a form contract requiring the contractor to perform the work for 
its cost plus a contractor's fee. The contract specified a guaranteed maximum price. But it 
also contained a specially inserted provision allowing the contractor to ‘re-bid’ the 
project after the plans were complete.”134  “The new paragraph was entitled, 
‘GUARANTEED MAXIMUM PRICE TO BE DETERMINED.’ It provided, ‘Owner 
and Contractor agree that the plans for the project are incomplete and will be re-bid at 
completion of the permit set. The GMP shall be adjusted accordingly by change order for 
any deletions or additions to the scope of the work.’” 135   
 
 The dealership became dissatisfied with Roel’s performance.  It stopped paying 
and found a replacement GC.  In the meantime, Roel submitted a rebid of $1.2 million.  
                                                 
132 At 829. 
133 Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2006 WL 3354013 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.). 
134 At 1.   
135 “The plans' architectural drawings were only 60 to 70 percent complete. Their structural drawings were 
approximately 50 percent complete. The plans lacked any foundational, mechanical, electrical, or plumbing 
drawings.”  At 2. 
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Roel sued for, among other things, the lost profits from being deprived of the opportunity 
to re-bid.  It won on the issue of breach, but lost on this element of damages.   
 
The rebid provision suggests the contractor had the duty to begin work 
based on the preliminary plans; the dealership had the duty to pay for that 
work and allow the contractor to submit a rebid based on the completed 
plans. At that point, the contract would simply be discharged by 
performance, subject to the formation of a new contract at a new price if 
the dealership accepted the rebid. The rebid provision does not suggest the 
dealership was bound to accept any reasonable rebid, regardless of price, 
as the contractor claims. Nor does it suggest the contractor could earn its 
entire contractor's fee by merely submitting the rebid.136  
 
 Drennan’s role was to provide support for the notion that the contractual right to 
rebid did not support the GC’s claim to lost profits. “No reasonable probability exists the 
contractor would have earned its contractor's fee. The contract did not require the 
dealership to accept the contractor's rebid. The term “re-bid,” like the term “bid,” implies 
an offer. (See Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409, 413, 333 P.2d 757 [bid 
is an “offer” or “promise to perform”] . . .   Thus, while the contractor had the right to 
begin work on the project and submit a rebid upon completion of the plans, the dealership 
retained the right to reject the rebid.”137  Thus, rather than creating an obligation as 
Traynor had, here Drennan’s role is to negate the obligation.  A rebid is only an offer 
and, according to this court, there is no duty to accept it. 
 
B. Section 87(2) 
 Drennan  begat Restatement Second §87(2).  “An offer which the offeror should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of 
the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”  The irrevocable 
construction bid cases get along just fine without it.  Only five of these cases even 
mentioned that Section.138  Of the five, three found an agreement,139 and two did not.140  
On the other hand, §90 was mentioned in about 2/3 of the cases.  Whether or not one 
agrees with Drennan, it is clear that the courts have found §90 adequate to deal with the 
problem.141  The innovation has been a dud, even on its home turf. 
 
 It hasn’t fared any better elsewhere.  Only a few cases outside the construction 
bidding context even consider 87(2), and in even fewer is it successful.  Of the 13, cases 
                                                 
136 At 9. 
137 At 8. (emphasis in original) 
138 Three of these cited to its predecessor, Section 89(b) of the Draft Restatement. 
139 Loranger Const. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co. 384 N.E.2d 176; Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc. 587 P.2d 
177; Arango Const. Co. v. Success Roofing, Inc. 730 P.2d 720. 
140 Mitchell v. Siqueiros 582 P.2d 1074; Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., Inc. 674 A.2d 521. 
141 Four of the five cited §90 as well. 
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the plaintiff succeeded in only four.  The aforementioned Strata case is one.  The others 
are Dankrag, Ltd. v. International Terminal Operating Co.,142 Guckenberger v. Boston 
University,143 and In re Donovan's Third Case.144  In the first of these, the cost of 
shipping goods turned out to be much greater than the carrier had anticipated.  It tried to 
get out of the contract by arguing mutual mistake.  The court rejected this defense and 
found that there was an enforceable contract, a perfectly routine result with no need to 
call upon §87(2).  The court tacked on a footnote invoking it: “The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel also provides authority for the Court’s conclusion that ITO was 
bound to perform at the offered rate of $15.75 per long ton, since the CARIB EVE had 
proceeded up river to Albany in reliance, at least in part, on ITO’s offer.”   
 
In Guckenberger, students at Boston University with learning disabilities sued 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the school had reneged on 
certain promises to them.  The court cited the precursor to §87(2)145 finding that the 
school had promised to accommodate students with learning disabilities and had failed to 
adequately do so.  One such disability was a “history of difficulty with foreign language 
learning.”146  The students’ reasonable reliance on the school’s promises had created a 
contract and the university’s failure to honor the agreement entitled the student to 
damages.147 
 
Finally, Donovan concerned a lump sum settlement of a disability claim with an 
insurer (Liberty). Donovan withdrew his appeal of a denial of a finding of total disability 
and on the same day an agreement to pay him a lump sum of $50,000 was memorialized 
in a letter. The lump sum payment had to be approved by a state agency, the Department 
of Industrial Accidents (DIA).  Before it gave its approval, Donovan was hospitalized (on 
unrelated grounds) and died.  All the paperwork had been done for the lump sum 
payment, save a signature by the insurer’s counsel.  He refused to sign and Liberty 
refused to pay.  The DIA and the court concluded that Donovan’s withdrawal of his 
appeal was induced by the promise to pay the lump sum.  “This interrelationship of 
Liberty's offer and the withdrawal of the appeal is well supported in the record by the 
July 16, 1997, letter of Donovan's counsel to Liberty, which confirmed the receipt of the 
offer and at the same time indicated “[t]he employee [ac]cepts that offer subject to 
approval of the [DIA], and ... will withdraw the appeal and request lump sum 
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proceedings.”148  Since Donovan’s withdrawal was made in reliance on Liberty’s 
promise, the court invoked §89B(2) and found the contract valid.149 
 
These few positive citations don’t amount to much—one win every nine years.  
And, even then, the court could probably have gotten to the same result without relying 
on §87(2) at all. The more numerous cases rejecting §87(2) generally conclude that there 
was not substantial reliance or that denying the existence of a contract would not result in 
an injustice.  To give the flavor of these opinions I will summarize two. In 2949 Inc. v. 
McCorkle, 150 the dispute centered on the interpretation of a pre-printed form contract 
with an irrevocability clause that the plaintiff, a sign company, had presented to a client.  
The court held that there was no consideration for the irrevocability clause and, therefore, 
the only way that the clause would be enforceable would be to find that the plaintiff had 
relied to its detriment. The court distinguished §87(2) from §90, noting that the former 
included the modifier “substantial,” while the latter did not.151  The plaintiff’s asserted 
reliance was performance of a credit check and a reference check, and an examination of 
the order.  This the court found to be insubstantial and it therefore granted the defendant 
buyer’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
The facts in the second case are more complicated so I will simplify them 
somewhat.152  In essence, in 1989 the five top managers of a bank held 39% of the bank’s 
shares and were granted an option to buy the remaining 61% within one year of the death 
of the majority shareholder.  This turned out to be a valuable option; when the dispute 
arose the option price was about $1.9 million and its value was about $4.5 million.  The 
agreement was for “One Dollar ($1.00) and other valuable consideration,” but no 
monetary consideration was actually paid.  Years later, after the majority shareholder’s 
death, the trustee for the majority shareholder repudiated the option agreement, saying 
that there had been no consideration.  At that point the managers attempted to pay the $1, 
but the proffer was rejected and the court held that it was too late.153  The court then 
turned to the estoppel arguments.  There was some evidence that the managers had been 
promised that they would have the option if they continued to work at the bank during the 
majority owner’s lifetime.  Even if this were so, the court held, the plaintiffs would still 
lose: 
 
[D]efendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot establish that they relied on the 
alleged promises to their detriment. They contend that the plaintiffs were 
adequately compensated for their services as employees of the bank, and 
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therefore evidence is lacking that any of the individual plaintiffs detrimentally 
relied on the promises allegedly made….  
 
The court agrees that the evidence advanced by the plaintiffs does not 
demonstrate detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiffs “of a substantial 
character.” See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(2). Hence the refusal 
of the court to enforce the alleged promise would not result in injustice. The 
plaintiffs do not dispute that they were very adequately compensated for the 
years they remained employees of the bank. Some of the plaintiffs testified by 
deposition that they had declined to pursue other opportunities based upon 
their understanding that they would someday have the opportunity to control 
the bank. However, this is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support 
an inference that the plaintiffs substantially relied on the alleged promises and 
as a result suffered detriment. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(2) 
cmt. e.154 
 
The court did not indicate how it determined (on a summary judgment motion) that the 
managers had received adequate compensation already and that either the $2.6 million 
that the managers would have split was not substantial, or that depriving them of those 
shares would not be an injustice.  I would have thought that a bonus averaging half a 
million dollars per person should have crossed the substantiality hurdle.  But that is not 
my point.  The decision is an indication of the futility of relying on §87(2) as a substitute 
for consideration. 
 
 VII. Conclusions 
 
 Contracts casebooks and treatises treat Drennan as if it were a Really Big Deal.  
Traynor invented something new, an irrevocable option, albeit one tempered by concerns 
about reliance and injustice, that dramatically altered the offer-acceptance framework.  It 
didn’t happen.  Rather than revolutionizing contract doctrine writ large, it has been 
confined to its facts—disputes between general contractors and subs.  In practice its 
domain has been even narrower, GC-sub disputes in which the owner is a public entity. 
 
 Given its practical irrelevance, the question is: why Drennan’s favored place in 
the contract doctrine universe?  Part of the answer most likely stems from the drama of 
one giant (Traynor) taking on another (Hand).  Part, no doubt is the result of history—at 
that time contracts scholars were looking for vehicles to advance the promissory estoppel 
alternative to consideration.  And part of the answer is that, whatever its warts, Drennan 
is fun to teach.  
 
 I think there is a deeper problem.  The authors of casebooks and treatises try to 
distill abstract principles from the case law.  Their focus is on decided cases.  The 
context, particularly any regulatory constraints on the parties, is given little attention.  
Traynor’s treatment of contract law and the naming statute in Holder as being from two 
unrelated bodies of law is a striking example of the disconnect.  And there is even less 
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attention to what parties actually do.  To be sure, a number of casebooks include a brief 
discussion of Shultz’s study of the GC-sub relationship in the middle of the last 
century.155  But none emphasize the limited scope of that project—public projects only.  I 
do not mean to suggest that litigators should be given free rein to introduce context 
arguments into every dispute.  But there is no reason for scholars to so restrict their 
inquiry.  If we are going to restate contract law, we might as well restate the law that 
parties actually use, rather than attempting to generalize from context-specific decisions 
in which the context has been excised. 
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